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This thesis examines the role of U.S. mass persuasion during modern war and the effects 
of propaganda, strategic narrative, military strategy, and policy on morale and public 
opinion. Through historical analysis of several phases of U.S. war propaganda, from the 
world wars to the Global War on Terror, this study aims to understand the political 
essence and the cultural and functional nuance of propaganda in a wartime democracy. 
Prevailing wisdom holds that the United States managed a coherent, focused, and 
intelligently wielded campaign of mass persuasion in Europe, 1941–1989. Yet, American 
strategic mass persuasion efforts since 2001 have consistently failed to persuade friend 
and foe of the strategic efficacy of American and allied campaigns.  
This thesis finds that wartime propaganda has little effect if it is not derived from 
a concrete overall strategy, policy, and narrative. The most impactful uses of mass 
persuasion rely on a perpetual rebalancing of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s 
paradoxical trinity—violence, chance, and policy, anchored in democratic statecraft and 
the virtues of pluralism. Therefore, to better facilitate balancing, an independent 
governmental agency charged with information management during war may better serve 
the public, policy makers and the military, producing the desired political ends. 
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I. ON PROPAGANDA 
From the epoch of total war through present conflicts, the United States has 
employed mass persuasion, or propaganda, to influence morale and public opinion. This 
thesis examines how effective propaganda, strategic narrative, military strategy, and 
policy—as opposed to policy abstraction—together shape overall perception of war. By 
studying propaganda in a wartime democracy and its role in the mass mobilization of the 
public for conflict, the research reveals a deeper understanding into the political, cultural, 
and functional essence of mass persuasion, in either limited or total war. This analysis 
considers what propaganda is, what it does, and how it has worked in the past. 
The author seeks to recognize instances of propaganda’s successful use to 
determine keys to its implementation in the future. The most effective example of U.S. 
propaganda during conflict occurred in Europe and provides a multitude of historical 
scholarship on the subject. The prevailing wisdom holds that the United States managed a 
coherent, focused, and intelligently wielded campaign of mass persuasion in the earlier 
period of hot and cold war in Europe, 1941–1990. Yet, the case changed in recent 
decades. Since 2001, American strategic mass persuasion at home and abroad has 
consistently neglected to persuade friend and foe of the strategic efficacy of American 
and allied campaigns. 
Particularly in light of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, current analysis suggests 
an ongoing and worsening juxtaposition between policy and strategic narrative 
development. As a result of an overarching grand strategy abstraction, perceived 
strategic, operational, and tactical failures on the battlefield contrast with the perception 
that the Islamist enemy in its variety applies propaganda more efficiently and with greater 
success than those in the echelons of the U.S. government, including the armed forces. 
Essentially, propaganda is of little effect if not derived from democratic statecraft 
vis-à-vis a concrete grand strategy, policy, strategic narrative, and perpetual rebalancing 
of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, the threefold forces of war 
in the real world: “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a 
 2 
blind natural force; . . . the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit 
is free to roam; and . . . its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone.”1 Clausewitz focuses on the political and psychological 
dimensions of war. For him, the ideas not only matter; they are paramount. Jack LeCuyer 
writes, “We must define our strategic future and tell our national story in a compelling 
way—and jointly embrace that common narrative in both the executive and the 
legislative branches of the federal government.”2 Where government policy goes, the 
military is sure to follow. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
Propaganda—a term used here neutrally, not in its totalitarian sense—has 
returned to prominence in policy- and opinion-making circles as the global war on terror 
(GWOT) winds down and shifts phases. The role of mass persuasion in this context must 
be understood in terms of both its promise and its perils for strategy and soldiers as well 
as democracy. The fighting soldier will inevitably suffer from such a dichotomy of 
strategy and mass persuasion, whereby the efficacy of strategy rivals the easy resort to 
the “stab in the back” as a catch-all explanation for failure.  
While one can argue that people remain surrounded by propaganda in one form or 
another, the message is not being contrived and implemented in America or abroad with 
an effective plan or concerted direction to counter the enemy’s efforts. In other words, it 
appears that the propaganda needed for raising domestic mobilization and supporting 
foreign strategic operations against fundamentalist Islamist enemies has been throttled 
way back or is out of commission. In the dimmest view, U.S. propaganda today has taken 
on a form that only mobilizes young war fighters, while ignoring the need for strategic 
propaganda on the national level to mobilize the general citizenry and to counter a non-
state threat.  
                                                
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 89. 
2 Jack LeCuyer, “Op-Ed: A National Strategic Narrative and Grand Strategy for the 21st Century,” The 




Without a clear policy, it is difficult to form a strategic narrative to explain U.S. 
actions on the battlefield, free of abstraction. Without that strong narrative driving 
propaganda, America has less of an impact on the way the enemy, citizens, soldiers, and 
allies view a conflict. The country currently lacks a strong plan and an explanation of that 
plan. National security analyst Anthony Cordesman explains that the United States 
“needs stronger public diplomacy and information campaigns.”3 This thesis expands on 
his concerns, providing both the strategic insights and the empirical evidence that defines 
the underlying problem and, sketches in the possible steps of a solution.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
The political and strategic role of mass persuasion in twentieth-century wartime 
as a means of home-front cohesion and international legitimation form a basis for 
comparison with the most recent efforts at mass persuasion and propaganda since 
September 11, 2001.  Research shows that U.S. propaganda, strategic narrative, and 
policy in the epoch of total war constitute the point of departure for any present-day 
analysis of contemporary efforts by soldiers and public diplomats in counterterror 
campaigns since late 2001. 
This thesis examines the theory, praxis, and effectiveness of propaganda at each 
of the key historical moments listed: WWI, the interwar academic study of propaganda, 
WWII, the Cold War including Korea and Vietnam, and the global war on terror, 
including Iraq and Afghanistan. Theory in this case describes the ways that propaganda 
supports policy and its overall adherence or furtherance of the strategic narrative. Praxis 
looks to determine how propaganda was developed, disseminated, and controlled, using 
standard operating procedures, directives, programmatic guidelines, and censorship. The 
question is not only why does America fight wars, but also whether the country does a 
good job at communicating the answer to that question to the public. What factors 
determine or affect America’s success when leveraging propaganda in times of conflict?  
                                                
3 Anthony H. Cordesman and Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Changing US Security 
Strategy: The Search for Stability and the 'Non-War' against 'Non-Terrorism,'" 2013, viii, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/130917_Cordesman_ChangingUSSecurityStrategy_Web.pdf. 
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For example, propaganda’s role in the effective mass mobilization of the U.S. 
population during WWII, in response to fascist and Japanese imperial aggression, is 
generally considered straightforward. Can the same be said for propaganda’s 
effectiveness during the Korean and Vietnam Wars? Perhaps these proxy wars fought 
against global communism should be considered battles within an overarching Cold War, 
which the United States inevitably won. Therefore, it could be said that the Cold War 
propaganda apparatus actually worked. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be viewed 
similarly. The final disposition of the conflict, while far from certain, can be affected by 
propaganda. These wars, too, call for propaganda waged from a codified strategic 
narrative derived from coherent grand strategy and in concert with policy and military 
strategy.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
At issue is the role propaganda plays in balancing the government, military, and 
the people in limited war. Clausewitz states in “the consequences for theory,” a balance 
between these components must be achieved and more importantly maintained to realize 
a viable theory for war.4 Thus, propaganda wielded haphazardly in an effort to support 
balance of the paradoxical trinity is less apt to be effective, because it does not, and 
cannot in its inherently flawed nature, balance the government, military, and the people. 
As Clausewitz states, “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary 
relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
reason alone it would be totally useless.”5  
Clausewitz provides the theoretical framework for considering propaganda’s use 
in the age of mass politics, while J. Michael Sproule’s treatment of propaganda and 
democracy shows how they necessarily changed from their inception until the present. 
This aspect is important when considering the hatred and violence side of Clausewitz’s 
trinity as it pertains to morale and mobilization. Initially, in the progressive era (circa 
1900–1914), muckrakers like Will Irwin invented modern American total war 
                                                
4 Clausewitz, On War, 89. 
5 Ibid. 
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propaganda in WWI.6 The advent of propaganda inspired a backlash against it circa 
1920. Americans began to worry that effective domestic propaganda campaigns had 
tricked them into supporting the European war. That period of skepticism ultimately 
prompted a deeper academic inquiry into the essence of propaganda in the interwar 
period.7  
For example, Walter Lippmann, a man of this era, saw the public as potentially 
becoming dupes of special interest, much like today’s “low information voter.”8 This 
concern for the protection of democracy from propaganda led to what Sproule calls “the 
straight thinking and the polemical perspectives on social influence.”9 In the search for a 
deeper understanding of propaganda, two different approaches emerged. The straight 
thinkers believed in educating the citizenry how to think, rather than how to recognize 
propaganda, while the anti-propaganda polemicists opted for developing methods to 
recognize propaganda.10 This struggle between these two camps played out in the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which was ultimately undone by muckraking critics 
and the impending Fascist threat.11  
As Philip Taylor explains, WWII saw the advent of extremely high quality 
propaganda.12 The people who produced propaganda for Allied and Axis powers 
represented a struggle of mass society and political ideology, and this struggle likely led 
to its effectiveness as a weapon of diplomacy by other means.13  
                                                
6 J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass 
Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8. 
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 Ibid., 94. 
9 Ibid., 92. 
10 Ibid., 128. 
11 Ibid., 177. 
12 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, Third Edition (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 211, 227. 
13 Ibid., 208. 
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Propaganda reached deep at the time.  Lord Reith, British Minister of Information 
declared, news is “the shock troops of propaganda.”14 Even with a robust censorship 
program in place to help shape morale, Taylor shows that the number of clashes between 
the press and the Ministry of Information (MOI) were infrequent, occurring early in the 
war, and are a testament to the overall effectiveness of the British system.15 Specifically, 
pre-censorship occurred at the London headquarters of the Press Association, which 
supplied domestic news outlets.16 When MOI had completed its censorship, news was 
then released to the different media outlets. Censors did not change opinions found in 
content, leading the public to believe very little censorship was actually taking place, so 
their program was palatable even to liberal commentators.17 In this way, Britain was 
effectively applying balancing to the anger and hatred side of the Clausewitzian trinity. 
While not reaching the higher level of viewership in the U.S., Britain maintained 
nearly 30 million moviegoers a month in 1945—nearly half the population thus primed 
for propaganda. The movie houses did not disappoint.18 Arguably, the success of the 
films of this period stemmed from average men and women being portrayed realistically, 
rather than as caricatures.19 A similar phenomenon can be found in today’s popular 
reality television programs and their ability to shape public discourse and morality. 
However, unlike American reality television, which cannot be said to advance a coherent 
or unitary program, British films in the middle-1940s meant to express the need for 
citizens to unite for victory and the defeat of the German nation.20  
Take for instance, Mrs. Miniver, a film produced by Metro Goldwyn Mayer in 
1942. The underlying theme of the movie is not the overt villainization of the Third 
Reich, but an understated framing of English stoicism, which undoubtedly helped drive 
                                                




18 Ibid., 217. 
19 Ibid., 218. 
20 Ibid., 220. 
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American support for inclusion into the Second World War. The main character, Mrs. 
Miniver, is portrayed as a compassionate mother, whose family is touched by war and 
who suffers as a result of it. Her family does not desire war, but surely do not shirk their 
responsibility to support it either. The movie effectively conveys the way in which total 
war is viewed as “the people’s war,” one in which all are involved and all must make 
sacrifices. It is brilliant propaganda, because Mrs. Miniver could be anybody’s mother, 
and as such she can be immediately appreciated. Viewers of the film can make a near 
instantaneous emotional connection with her, empathize with her, and support Mrs. 
Miniver’s compassion and resilience in the face of total war. 
This film serves as just one example of how propaganda at that time was 
thoughtfully shaped and implemented on a mass scale by professional practitioners 
working to further a goal. Propaganda necessarily informed and influenced the views of 
the public, of the military, and most importantly the policymakers. Therefore, it is fair to 
consider that with continued public and military support to meet policy ends, policy 
makers would feel confident in their decision making processes both then and today.  
In contrast to the rallying sensibilities during WWII, the prevailing narrative 
about the Vietnam War holds that the U.S. armed forces were somehow prevented from 
winning by nefarious civilian powers and the press. In real life, however, the press didn’t 
lose the war on it own, and the American public did not go soft on Vietnam.21 The 
American public supported Vietnam for several years, at least until it became obvious 
that the war was unwinnable, following the Tet Offensive in 1968.22 The sense that 
morale had been the weak link was not entirely true. Rather, the hatred side of 
Clausewitz’s trinity fell out of balance late in the war, though likely the sides of chance 
and policy were out of balance, too.23 
                                                
21 Daniel C. Hallin, The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 211, 213. 
22 Ibid., 213. 
23 Ibid., 215. 
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In 1960s Vietnam, the United States wanted to fight a conventional limited war.24 
The Air Force fought its war, and the Army, too, waged its own. President Lyndon 
Johnson did not fully mobilize the country out of fear. Johnson was living with the 
memory of the Korean War, whereby costs rose and public support fell.25 Later, the aerial 
bombardment during the Seige of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive slaughtered the Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese Army, but it failed to make a difference. Unlike America, Vietnam 
was not fighting a limited war, but a total war.26 This is the climax of the credibility gap. 
Meanwhile, President Richard Nixon’s 1973 declaration of an agreement of “peace with 
honor” seemed to translate more as “stab in the back,” particularly after the fall of 
Saigon.27 In other words, a mismatch of strategic narrative derived from abstract policy 
led to poor domestic propaganda development, resulting in less than desirable ends. The 
paradoxical trinity was not balanced.  
In fact, as a rule, the public has accepted the credible policy, strategic narrative, 
and the propaganda that emanates from its democratic government so long as it more or 
less brings results.28 When the divergence between the strategic narrative and reality 
become too great, the problem is not propaganda, but the disconnect between mass 
politics, ends and means in war, and the ideal form of strategy, hence the need for a 
balancing of the trinity.29 A balanced trinity is one in which all sides are engaged. A 
trinity where only politics and chance are engaged will not yield desired policy goals. 
The power of propaganda typically relies on expert conception, development, and 
dissemination. Of course, in the case of a country at wartime, it must support some 
desired ends, such as democratic statecraft and strategy. If propaganda appears effective, 
but is attached to a poor, abstract, or otherwise unsound policy that does not support a 
grand strategy, then it will not generate the desired results in practice and in its final 
                                                
24 Ibid., 212. 
25 Ibid., 212–13. 
26 Ibid., 214. 
27 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: 
Hurst, 2012), 210. 
28 Ibid., 179. 
29 Ibid., 188. 
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outcome. That is to say even “great” propaganda will yield little in the way of garnering 
public support or acquiescence of the enemy when strategically unsound. In fact, this 
propaganda may unwittingly have an adverse effect by bringing about enemy success on 
the battlefield and a lack of support on the home front. Any consideration of propaganda 
is all for naught if one does not first consider a theoretical framework within which 
propaganda can be justified and be used to support and further policy goals.  
So why is it so difficult to balance mass persuasion during a war? In the modern 
vernacular, there is a value assigned and vast difference between kinetic or combat effect 
and strategic or military planning effect in the information and propaganda realm as it 
pertains to the conduct of war. Singaporean Lieutenant Colonel Teo Cheng Hang posits: 
Unfortunately, non-kinetic methods are underrated, especially in the 
military. Compared to kinetic methods, their consequences tend to be 
indirect and therefore sometimes do not produce immediately observable 
effects. Kinetic methods and their intended effects are much easier to 
grasp because they create direct, immediately perceivable effects.30 
Combat effects are immediately recognized, whereas strategic effect, a result of a 
demonstrable strategic narrative and concurrent propaganda push, are assumed to be less 
recognizable. Yet, certain incidents have countered that perception. The news of torture 
and abuse performed on detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison during the first few years of 
the Iraq war had an almost immediate effect on domestic and foreign perception of 
American conduct toward prisoners of war. Nearly a century before that, the sinking of 
the Lusitania leading up to WWI was similarly portrayed as a blatant atrocity. In both 
cases, the instigators of the activity acted without recognizing the negative strategic effect 
resulting from their behavior. America faced backlash resulting from the soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib, and Germany too suffered after the attack. Worsening the negative effect, Karl 
Goetz, a celebrated Munich artist, misunderstood strategic narrative and produced a 
medal commemorating the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, a misstep that Britain 
leveraged to their advantage.31 Abu Ghraib was an example of prisoner abuse and a 
                                                
30 Teo Cheng Hang, “Non-Kinetic Warfare: The Reality and the Response,” Pointer: Journal of the 
Singapore Armed Forces 36, no. 2 (2010): 54, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2010/v36n1/feature5.html. 
31 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 178–79. 
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misinterpretation of strategic narrative, which was captured on film and released with 
negative strategic effect to the U.S. and was leveraged with great affect by Islamist 
enemies. The sinking of the Lusitania was characterized as Nazi barbarism and with the 
release of the Goetz medal a similar negative strategic effect occurred and played into the 
hands of the British propaganda.  
In summary, Clausewitz presents the theoretical foundation for understanding the 
relationship between the three sides of his trinity—hatred, chance, and policy—and the 
need for an emphasis on the people to produce an acceptable outcome. In communicating 
a message to the people on a mass scale, propaganda has an effect on all three sides. A 
balancing of these three forces can and has occurred in previous wars, yet in some cases 
an imbalance has also occurred. As the U.S. fails to engender a strong enough sense of 
hatred and force to match the other aspects of policy and military chance, they are 
relegated to working alone, in a proverbial vacuum free of the masses. The U.S. can learn 
from both its past successes in balancing the Clausewitzian trinity and its shortcomings. 
Given events in Iraq and Afghanistan in the twenty-first century, coupled with an 
ostensibly ongoing conflict between the United States and radical Islamists, the country 
requires a framework for understanding the essence and nuance of propaganda used to 
achieve balance in this endeavor.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
One significant problem with any efforts to categorically assign levels of political 
effectiveness to propaganda, either abroad or at home, is the inherent subjectivity in the 
dimensions of policy, strategy, and culture. By nature, propaganda’s effectiveness is 
determined by the extent to which its audience adopts or accepts it in conflict and the 
passion of war. This relative effectiveness must be substantiated through corroborating 
literature; therefore, definitive proof of effectiveness is anecdotal at best, as it relies on 
voting records and public opinion polls, and erroneous at worst. Unfortunately, most 
available evidence related to the success of propaganda in influencing public opinion fails 
to rise to the level of scientific proof, leaving the relative successfulness of propaganda as 
a mostly subjective endeavor.  
 11 
Lindley Fraser, in the forward of his book Propaganda, summarizes the difficulty 
in applying scientific methodology to the study of propaganda, and yet still manages to 
produce a work of note. First, Fraser explains that presenting a study, as a historical 
narrative is nearly impossible because “there is no continuous thread to follow.”32 
Second, it cannot “be analyzed as a systematic scientific discipline since its techniques 
vary so greatly according to the purposes for which it is used.”33 This means one cannot 
analyze propaganda because one does not always know what is and isn’t propaganda, and 
because one does not always know the “secret” goal behind it. Still, as Clausewitz said: 
Anyone for whom all this is meaningless either will admit no theoretical 
analysis at all, or his intelligence has never been insulted by the confused 
and confusing welter of ideas that one so often hears and reads on the 
subject of the conduct of war. These have no fixed point of view; they lead 
to no satisfactory conclusion; they appear sometimes banal, sometimes 
absurd, sometimes simply adrift in a sea of vague generalization; and all 
because this subject has seldom been examined in a spirit of scientific 
investigation.34 
Therefore, much like Lindley, this thesis will accept an uneasy compromise between an 
analytical and historical approach to the problem of propaganda in relation to war.  
Given the myriad variables to consider, theory and praxis—which are a recurring 
theme in Sproule’s book Propaganda and Democracy in statecraft—designate a logical 
starting point. For this thesis, a measure of effectiveness will be determined as a 
verifiable strategic effect, which can be, at the minimum, attributed and accepted as a 
nominal indicator of propaganda’s success. 
A highly selective cross section of entities relevant to propaganda research 
provide a sample of indicators. They include several types of entities, presented here out 
of historical sequence. The broadest source of historical evidence regarding propaganda’s 
effect comes from government agencies tasked with information management, including 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI), April 13, 1917–August 21, 1919; Office Of 
War Information (OWI), June 1942–September 1945; U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 
                                                
32 L. M. Fraser, Propaganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), vii. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Clausewitz, On War, 132. 
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August 1953–October 1, 1999, and the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), October 30, 
2001–February 26, 2002. Research is also made available from academic sources such as 
the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA), 1937–1942. Finally, the contemporary era of 
conflict brings us detailed information through contracted or coalition entities including 
the Rendon Group, and the Coalition Information Center, which operated for a year 
ending October 2002, when it became the White House Office of Global Communication. 
In addition, relevant empirics will provide contextual evidence to answer further 
questions and help reveal why propaganda may have been successful or less successful 
throughout the historical periods noted above. Where applicable, these include, but are 
not limited to: 
• The level of mobilization of propaganda producing infrastructure  
• The number of departments functioning during a certain period of time 
• The number of servicemen and the number of casualties 
• The deaths of famed journalists and informational leaders 
• The degree of detail, in terms of clarity or abstraction, in directives 
controlling propaganda development. 
• The number of ex-military politicians serving during time of conflict 
• The presence and prevalence of technology in print media, art, posters, 
radio, film, cable television, cellular communication, digital media, and 
social networks  
This further information enables a more holistic look at the theory, praxis, and 
effectiveness of propaganda's development and implementation as it pertains to the 
conduct of war.  
This study is exclusively a comparative study per se. Instead, it follows along the 
lines of chronology, observing cause and effect throughout America’s past wars, to 
discover significant factors related to the effectiveness of propaganda. Therefore, 
historical accuracy is paramount, and a careful consideration of propaganda, specifically 
from WWI to the present, will provide in-depth illustration of the approach at work. This 
thesis augments the sources cited in the literature review with The Great War and 
Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-
 13 
1940, by Stefan Goebel; Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at 
Home and Abroad, by Kenneth Osgood; and On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the 
Vietnam War, by Harry G. Summers. 
When considering propaganda in the twenty-first century, many involved in the 
most recent wars and the ongoing global war on terror—including the author—may 
question the effectiveness of propaganda as a product incongruous strategic narrative and 
abstract grand strategy. The grand strategy of a global war on terrorists, therefore, is a 
faulty means for providing a basis for building strategic narrative. Furthermore, it does 
little to mobilize the public beyond continuing to supply new, incoming soldiers to join 
the fight. This thesis augments the sources cited in the literature review with 
contemporary additions related to the topic, the books Breach of Trust: How Americans 
Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country, by Andrew J. Bacevich; Counterinsurgency: 
Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, by Douglas Porch; and America's Victories: 
Why the U.S. Wins Wars and Will Win the War on Terror, by Larry Schweikart. 
Overall, the sources underlying this analysis are primarily books and scholarly 
journals addressing WWI, WWII, Cold War, and the global war on terror. In addition, the 
author has reviewed primary sources from the Hoover Institution Library to ascertain 
Office of War Information internal procedures for propaganda implementation. Finally, 
the research also considers a range of methods of propaganda dispersion across media, 
from artwork to posters, from radio to film, and television to the Internet. Beyond the 
literature review, cited sources related to multimedia propaganda include Film 
Propaganda in Britain and Nazi Germany: World War II Cinema, Jo Fox; Imagined 
Battles: Reflections on War in European Art, by Peter Paret; The Making of the Cold War 
Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex, by Ron T. Robin; and 
Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial, Media-Entertainment Network, by James 
Der Derian, 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a critical analysis of propaganda. It explores what constitutes 
the difference between propaganda, strategic communication, information operations, 
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public relations, psychological operations, information dominance, information 
operations, and military deception. The analysis further concerns itself with the 
consumption of propaganda by domestic and foreign audiences and the uneasy pairing of 
propaganda and democracy. The chapter relies on examples of historical governmental 
practitioners and their general levels of success.  
Chapter III examines the U.S. understanding of the threat of Germany during the 
First and Second World Wars. It focuses on the country’s use of targeted propaganda and 
its level of success in supporting political policy (grand strategy), supporting military 
strategy (strategic narrative), or simply affecting mobilization. Chapter IV moves on to 
the Cold War. Considering the U.S. understanding of the communist threat and the use of 
propaganda in response, the author looks again at its level of success in supporting 
political policy (grand strategy), supporting military strategy (strategic narrative), or 
simply affecting mobilization. Chapter V examines the most recent U.S. threat, the 
Islamists. The analysis of U.S. propaganda from the past decade-plus of war and the 
nature of recent propaganda to determine its level of success in supporting political 
policy (grand strategy); supporting military strategy (strategic narrative); or simply 
affecting mobilization. In each case, the analysis structures itself on how the 
understanding of a threat shaped the use and success of propaganda. 
In addition, all chapters contain analysis predicated on the desire to determine 
worthwhile observations regarding propaganda’s capabilities and limitations in the past 
and possibilities for their successful implementation in the future. The goal is to 
determine what has worked in the past and what will likely work in the future, assuming 




II. DEFINING PROPAGANDA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY 
So while we’re fighting the battle on the ground, we must also give due 
consideration to the battle in the mind. 
—Ellen K. Haddock, 
On Words: Clausewitz, Bin Laden, and Public Support 
What is propaganda? And how does it differ from public relations, strategic 
communication, information operations, and psychological operations? As Carl Friedrich 
explains in his book The New Belief in the Common Man, propaganda really serves two 
functions: to inform and to educate.35 These core functions allow propaganda to influence 
thinking and behavior through the presentation of information. Lindley Fraser explains, 
“Propaganda may be defined as the activity, or the art, of inducing others to behave in a 
way in which they would not behave in its absence.”36 Thus, the areas of public relations, 
strategic communication, information operations, and psychological operations should be 
recognized as propaganda because they all share a common goal. They all seek to 
influence behavior. As Harold Lasswell states, “Propaganda is concerned with the 
management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion 
rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism.”37 
A. DEFINITIONS 
Propaganda surrounds citizens. Fraser writes that in politics, all sides practice 
political propaganda at all times in an effort to persuade the public. Economic 
propaganda is advertising, which seeks to persuade the public to buy its products; moral 
                                                
35 Carl J. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942), 
85. 
36 Fraser, Propaganda, 1; The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines propaganda as “any form 
of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or 
indirectly.” Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 2001, 213. 
37 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1971), 
9. 
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propaganda, as he explains, is a “halfway house” between political and religious 
propaganda, which aims to “induce standards of behaviour in conformity with both the 
religion of the propagandist and the political and social society in which he believes.” 
Therefore, propaganda in its many forms induces its audience to act a certain way.38 He 
explains: 
People must be controlled by manipulating their [instincts and emotions] 
rather than by changing their reasonings. This is a fact of which politicians 
have always made use when they have persuaded their constituents by 
appealing to their sentiments, rather than by employing [reasoning], which 
would never be listened to or at least never prove effective for moving the 
crowds.39 
Harold Lasswell builds on the basic functions and elements of propaganda to 
study the use of propaganda in wartime. He identifies its four strategic aims: 
• To mobilize hatred against the enemy. 
• To preserve the friendship of allies.  
• To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the co-operation of 
neutrals. 
• To demoralize the enemy.40 
His very definition relates to the Clausewitzian trinity—hatred, chance, and policy—by 
emphasizing a negative view of the enemy and the importance of political strategy in 
securing allies. These are what drive the goals of propaganda in total war, but they should 
also be the goals of propaganda in limited war.  
Propaganda, though, dates back to before the periods of war being examined in 
this thesis and before the history of the U.S. Its origins and initial uses are religious. The 
word “propaganda” itself emerged during the Counter-Reformation, explains Mark 
Miller. It comes from the seventeenth-century Latin propagando, meaning to propagate, 
to spread the faith of the Roman Catholic Church and convince the masses to convert to 
                                                
38 Fraser, Propaganda, 1–2. 
39 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (Brooklyn: Ig Publishing, 2007), 219. 
40 Kenneth Alan Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2006), 26; Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I, 
195. 
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Christianity.41 Over the years, propaganda developed a more negative connotation. As a 
result of its association with “lies” (the wartime propaganda especially of illiberal 
regimes), the term needed to be replaced and sanitized, if not upgraded.42  
The first effort at rebranding propaganda settled on “public relations.” Public 
relations is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as the state of “the relationship between an 
organization or an important person and the general public; the occupation of establishing 
or maintaining a good relationship between an organization or an important person and 
the general public.”43 The practical operation of public relation involves the methodology 
for maintaining that “good relationship.” On the one hand, the public and policymakers 
alike recognized the power of mass persuasion and saw the usefulness of such a 
capability, whether in convincing the public to buy products, support political candidates, 
policies, or support total war, as readers will see throughout this research. On the other 
hand, the propaganda aspect of these efforts is essentially camouflaged in the kinder, 
gentler nomenclature. Public relations is therefore a non-pejorative framing of the 
manipulation of information to induce a desired behavior; it is propaganda. Indeed, 
Edward Bernays, WWI propagandist practitioner and “father of modern public relations,” 
agrees, propaganda is most closely connected to public relations. 
Next came strategic communications. The terminology is decidedly defense-
oriented and was originally meant to “streamline the military's messaging but instead led 
to bureaucratic bloat and confusion,” as one newspaper reported.44 Most closely related 
to public relations as Bernays saw it and propaganda as Fraser defines it, “strategic 
communications” was defined by the Department of Defense in 2009 as:  
focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key 
audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 
advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and 
                                                
41 Edward L. Bernays and Mark Crispin Miller, Propaganda (Brooklyn: Ig Publishing, 2005), 10. 
42 Ibid., 63.  
43 “Public Relations, N.,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, January 28, 2014, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/154069. 




objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, 
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 
national power.45  
This definition is somewhat ambiguous in its description of the nature of the 
DOD’s audience. Specifically, the definition does not make a clear delineation between 
domestic and foreign audiences, nor does it establish whether strategic communications 
are directed at one or both audiences. The article further explains, “The military has 
struggled for the past decade with its strategic communication. In 2001, an advisory 
board to the Pentagon was advised that it needed to do more to shape public opinion.”46  
While civilian news sources are not necessarily always academically sound, the 
number of stories they have reported related to this topic does indicate the apparently 
universal acceptance of strategic communication as a poor definition. In another story, 
the same publication quotes the Chairman of the Joint Chefs of Staff, Admiral Mike 
Mullen, weighing in on the term: “I really do not like the term at all. It confuses people,” 
Mullen said. "It means all things to all people. It's way overused and way overrated. I 
literally try never to use the term.”47 In the end, the DOD did away with the term 
“strategic communication.”48 Admiral Mullen voiced this view in 2012, but he realized 
the flawed nature of strategic communication as a definition as early as 2009. Research 
indicates this terminology can and does drive national security decision-making.49 Rosa 
Brooks, a former Bush administration political appointee working out of the Department 
of Defense policy office, explains that the DOD memo admonishing the term “strategic 
communications,” is in effect another squabble between those who disagree that it is a 
function of strategy versus communications.50That is to say, besides the term itself being 
                                                
45 Staff, “Joint Pub 1-02,” 250. 
46 USA Today, “Pentagon Drops ‘Strategic Communication.’” 
47 USA Today, “Pentagon Overseas Propaganda Plan Stirs Controversy,” accessed April 4, 2014, 
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48 USA Today, “Pentagon Drops ‘Strategic Communication.’” 
49 Mike Mullen, “Strategic Communications: Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 55 
(2009): 2. 
50 Rosa Brooks, “Confessions of a Strategic Communicator,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2012, 
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confusing—meaning all things to all people—there is also confusion as to its role as 
either the simple generator of press statements, or a systematic synchronizer of 
information across all levels of war while conforming to a strategic narrative. 
Information operations (IO) has a particularly military, or tactical, context. In this 
case, it is defined as, “The integrated employment, during military operations, of 
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries 
while protecting our own.”51 IO is rightly thought of as akin to psychological operations 
(PSY OPS) or since 2010, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), necessarily 
directed toward the enemy: 
Military Information Support Operations are planned operations to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the 
originator’s objectives.52  
IO, PSYOPS, and MISO are all essentially propaganda. Like the other forms of 
propaganda discussed, each seeks to influence behavior. They are all efforts necessarily 
directed at the adversary. 
The difference between IO, PSYOPS, or MISO and PR or strategic 
communications is in the intended audience and in the amount of untruth they contain. In 
fact, the amount of truth contained in communication correlates with the audience. The 
defense establishment recognizes the general responsibility of accountability and 
transparency that they owe a given audience. IO operators speak of "white propaganda" 
when they mean truthful accounts that are clearly targeted to a domestic audience.  
"Black propaganda" refers to truth-optional representations destined for foreign 
audiences.  "Grey" propaganda falls in between the extremes as far as truth contained 
within, but almost always gets directed to external audiences. 
                                                
51 Staff, “Joint Pub 1-02,” 127. 
52 Ibid., 171. 
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In all forms of propaganda, regardless of audience, truth matters. Fraser said, 
“Many people believe that as a matter of experience, truthfulness is the best form of 
propaganda and that systemic lying will defeat the propagandist’s ends.”53 Incredulous 
material or communication met with skepticism no longer has the desired effect of 
propaganda. In other words, the audience has to believe in the message of propaganda for 
it to have an impact. Kenneth Osgood explains, “Propagandists on many occasions used 
lies, misrepresentations, or deceptions, but propaganda that is based on fact and that rings 
true to the intended audience is more likely to be persuasive than bald-faced lies.”54  
B. THE ADVENT OF PROPAGANDA (CA. 1914–1920) 
An expert in public affairs and America’s use of propaganda, Osgood recognizes 
how the American people have responded to these mass campaigns throughout the 
country’s history. He notes that around the time of WWI, “Urbanization and 
industrialization had eroded traditional bonds of locality and kinship, … producing a vast 
workforce of atomized and isolated individuals comprising an ignorant, irrational public 
that was acquiring unprecedented power to shape the world around them.”55 Walter 
Lippmann, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist of the era, made similar observations about 
the general population at that time. He “anguished over the power of ‘the mass of 
absolutely illiterate, of feeble-minded, grossly neurotic, undernourished and frustrated 
individuals.”56 In order to control this mass, “Elite experts, who used new instruments of 
mass communications and social science research, could tame what these intellectuals 
openly derided as the ‘herd.’”57 And so propaganda on a level capable of mass persuasion 
was born.  
True or not, many recognized the scientific approach being taken after the First 
World War, to employ psychologically manipulative propaganda and increase its 
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56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 19. 
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pervasive spread within the American democracy.58 Philosopher John Dewey explained 
that propaganda could represent an especially difficult social problem.59 The problem 
was that wartime practitioners “would not forget, ‘the possibilities of guidance of the 
news upon which the formation of public opinion depends.’”60 The change had started 
some years earlier; Sproule writes, “The optimism about public opinion made it difficult 
to recognize media-oriented manipulation, the shift in the academic curriculum from 
argumentative oratory to informative composition had a similar effect by conveying an 
impression that public communication chiefly was a technical transfer of information.”61 
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, academia had begun a shift from oratory, 
rhetoric, and recitation to technical, written composition, no doubt a result of the 
industrial revolution.62 
Hagen Schulze explains that in Europe, this transformation began in the prior era, 
when “the scientific spirit of enquiry was wedded to industrial enterprise … the 
organization of work changed in ways that entailed major social adjustments.”63 During 
the period from the French Revolution to the First World War, “the idea of the nation 
underwent a fundamental change—not so much as far as its essential meaning was 
concerned, but more as regards its political significance and function.”64The age of mass 
persuasion had begun. Schulze explains, “Soon a critical public emerged, eager for 
discussion and imposing on governments and cabinets specific aims and policies which 
had been formulated more rapidly and effectively than ever before with the help of the 
mass media.”65  
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61 Ibid., 27. 
62 Ibid., 26, 28. 
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C. THE STATECRAFT DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA SUPPORTS IN WAR 
Propaganda operations in war are a promotional activity.66 They are, as Lasswell 
writes, “national prescription,” part of the application function of policy.67 “War aims are 
the political purposes that govern the strategy of warfare and that designate the objectives 
whose achievement designate victory,” he said.68 Therefore, the purpose of policy 
makers in this context is to ensure propaganda accurately reflects the goals of their 
policy.69 In addition, these policy goals aim to determine the nature of the relationship 
between propagandists and policymakers and their involvement in policy making.70 
Likewise the role of the propagandist is to ensure policy goals are developed in a way 
that leverages propaganda to the fullest extent.71  
Without a policy, grand strategy, military strategy, and strategic narrative, widely 
accepted as the gospel truth, the greatest propagandist practitioners struggle to provide an 
effective message that supports domestic mobilization, morale, and foreign support in 
defeating threats. Clausewitz provides a solid theoretical framework for understanding 
the problem of warfare as a whole, and as such it is the basis for considering 
propaganda’s role in the overall venture.  
Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity demands a balancing or equilibrium of its three 
sides. No one side can be more or less balanced.  Propaganda can and does affect all three 
sides of this triangle. Clausewitz explains: 
Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in 
the manifold activities generally designated as war. Fighting, in turn, is a 
trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. 
Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces 
exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war.72 
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Propaganda exerts influence on these moral, psychological forces. Domestically it 
influences policy, solidifies or weakens public resolve, and enrobes the military in the 
moral justness of its duty. 
Randal Marlin contends, “Clausewitz wished to unsure that war had a rational 
purpose and that waging it—and experiencing its horrors—was necessary only to achieve 
some important objective.”73 Therefore, subordinating the military to political elites 
would ensure its use of violence only to reach humanitarian ends.74 Specifically, 
Clausewitz understood the role of passion in warfare and of propaganda’s use in directing 
it.75 That is to say, he understood that “[t]he stronger the enemy’s feelings, the costlier 
the war is likely to be. Conversely, he believed, if one’s own people don’t feel strongly 
about the cause, success will be less likely.”76 The sense of visceral hatred that makes up 
one side of the Clausewitzian triangle relates closely to the strong feelings engendered by 
propaganda efforts. In his acclaimed work On War, the Prussian general writes, “Policy 
[and arguably propaganda] then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as 
their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.”77  
Even though Clausewitz is primarily associated with conventional, state directed, 
modern warfare, some modern-day military experts find rereading his theoretical insights 
from the perspective of the twenty-first century and the current landscape of 
asymmetrical warfare may be of value.78 Mika Kerttunen writes, “One should not 
understand the Trinity as a rigid triangle, but rather a framework that is structured yet 
flexible, where the three elements interact with each other.”79 He goes on to apply 
Clausewitz, saying, “Understanding and managing postmodern wars and conflicts 
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requires that we—in a Clausewitzian manner—acknowledge both the social and political 
nature and the holistic ontology of war.”80 This suggests a renewed focus on the people. 
In the twenty-first century, a proper balance of the trinity centers on the citizens. That is 
not to say that policy and the military should seek to manipulate the people. Instead, they 
can take cues from the success of the early days of propaganda. During the advent of 
propaganda, its practitioners began by convincing Americans what was right. This 
mechanism and approach was leveraged in total war, and this mechanism is 
fundamentally stronger than the twenty-first century approach to mass persuasion. Which 
is to say that propaganda today does try to convince people what is right, but not with the 
same fervor experienced in total war. 
  
                                                
80 Ibid., 10. 
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III. TOTAL WAR & THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1914-1945 
We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes formed, our ideas 
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is the logical 
result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast 
numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live 
together as a smoothly functioning society. 
—Edward Bernays 
Propaganda 
This era saw total war, the advent of propaganda, the realization of propaganda’s 
threat to democracy, and propaganda’s reemergence as a powerful tool for leveraging 
mass persuasion and mobilization against an insidious threat to national security. If there 
was ever a time in America’s history when it used propaganda with great effect—total 
mobilization and subsequent victory—this is it. From the creation of the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI) in 1917, to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937, to the 
Office of War Information in 1942, these agencies were devoted to either understanding 
propaganda in fundamental terms or leveraging propaganda in an effort to further inform 
and influence public opinion in support of government policy. Arguably, the greatest 
propagandists existed and plied their trade in this era. Leading propagandists Edward 
Bernays, Will Irwin, and George Creel were incredibly successful in carrying out their 
vision for why and how propaganda should be used in times of total war. They set the 
benchmark. Most importantly, they recognized that truthfulness of information was key 
to successful domestic propagandist endeavors and the following support for 
governmental policy. 
A. WORLD WAR I 
The CPI was established through Executive Order 2594 on April 13, 1917, just 
seven days after the U.S. declaration of war. It was charged with influencing U.S. public 
opinion. Creel was chosen by President Woodrow Wilson to head the agency. Today, 
Creel would be considered an investigative journalist, or even a reform-minded 
journalist, but in the early twentieth century, he was called a muckraker. A product of the 
times, Creel and his fellow muckrakers were driven to operate as truthful auditors of 
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industry, a kind of watchdog.  It is important to note that Creel was very much a 
progressive of the era, and very supportive of President Wilson. This support likely 
played a role in his being tapped for the chairmanship. On the other hand, Creel’s job—
mobilizing and motivating a skeptical and isolationist home front—was no cushy 
political sinecure. 
Indeed, Wilson’s own stance during his 1916 re-election campaign had been 
premised on non-intervention in the war. Joseph Bassani states, “It is clear that America’s 
entry into World War One represented a detour, rather than a departure, from America’s 
grand strategy of neutrality, unilateralism, preemption and hegemony over the Western 
Hemisphere.”81 Despite this viewpoint—or perhaps because of it—supporters of U.S. 
involvement in the Great War cast the conflict in particular terms.  “‘This war,’ declared 
the American Peace Society, ‘is not a war of territory, of trade routes or of commercial 
concerns, but of eternal principles.’ ‘There can be no end of war until after the collapse of 
the existing German imperial government.’”82 Unfortunately, little polling data from this 
era in American history exists indicate levels domestic support for war. Therefore, 
statements like those made by the American Peace Society provide a quasi-reliable gauge 
of public opinion shortly after America’s inclusion in the Great War. These examples 
indicate propaganda’s power through rapidly changing foreign policy. 
The shift owed as much to propaganda as to German unrestricted submarine 
warfare. Britain managed to cut German communication lines into the U.S. and capture 
German codes, cornering the propaganda battlefield for the United States.83 Wilson 
declared war under the premise that this was a war between right versus wrong.84 Wilson 
presented a strategic narrative that embodied policy in a form that was sold to the public 
in further support of ongoing military operations. He told the American people, “We have 
                                                
81 Joseph A. Bassani Jr, “Saving the World for Democracy. An Historical Analysis of America’s 
Grand Strategy in the 21st Century” (DTIC Document, 2005), 35, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA436658. 
82 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1978), 81.  
83 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 177, 182; Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 6. 
84 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 10. 
 27 
no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy 
and friendship.”85 Of course, the desired strategic effect was to divide the German people 
from their leaders, but this narrative also served another purpose. Americans were 
informed that the German people were not the enemy; it was the German regime that was 
the enemy. It was a militaristic German governmental ideology capable of endangering 
democratic principles that must be defeated.86  
This strategic narrative supported the work of the CPI because it gave a clear 
embodiment of the enemy, the stakes, and the underlying premise for further propaganda 
efforts. They were given a clear narrative to present. In the end, that sense of direction and 
clarity helped bring about their success. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker wrote, “I am 
obliged to believe that the sword is mightier than the pen. But this war wasn’t to be won by 
the sword alone. It was won by the pen as well as the sword, and I am not speaking now of 
a purely military victory, because this victory is simply a point in time.”87 
Propaganda employed during a time of war can take on various types of content and 
messaging. Lasswell designates sets of categories for such propaganda. One category 
features content related to the audience’s sense of values, including war aims, war guilt, 
and Satanism; another relates to their expectations, including the illusion of victory.88 In 
the case of WWI, U.S. propaganda adopted the form of war guilt. This guilt was 
specifically an indictment aimed at the nation of Germany, rather than on the German 
people as a whole.89 The illusion of victory was framed in terms of the defeat and near 
subjugation of Germany following an unequivocal Entente victory.90 In addition, Entente 
propaganda along Satanism lines, directed its ire at Germany with the phrase, “Hang the 
Kaiser.”91  
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The U.S. initially refrained from such rhetoric against the Kaiser, which illustrates 
the difference between Entente and U.S. war aims.92 Parsing of the differences between 
U.S. and Entente war aims is not the goal here; the goal is to understand that propaganda 
does, inherently support policy. As such, the propagandist requires guidance from 
policymakers to recognize the appropriate and necessary objects of propaganda’s focus 
and attachment of guilt.93 War aims, as a function of policy, are important to the 
propagandist. Their delineation helps to define propaganda production and further 
manage policy questions via inference, which could reduce the need for close guidance at 
lower levels.94 As Lasswell explains, war aims create a “matrix of political and 
diplomatic objectives, which interweave strategies of propaganda with all strategies—
military, economic, and others—pursued by a country at war.”95 
The CPI carried out the praxis of WWI propaganda most skillfully.96 At full 
strength, the agency was nearly 150,000 strong, split into two main sections—domestic 
and foreign. Domestically, the CPI consisted of various divisions based on methods of 
propaganda dispersal: film, pictorial publicity, and speaking, which included the Four 
Minute Men, and the news division that published the “Official Bulletin”97 With 75,000 
speakers in 5,200 communities, the Four Minute Men completed an estimated 755,190 
speeches.98 They delivered remarks prior to movie screenings and were essentially the 
predecessors to the WWII newsreels viewed by movie-going audiences. The foreign 
division contained the Foreign Press Bureau, Wireless and Cable Services, and Foreign 
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Film Service, which operated in over thirty countries. The foreign section further 
subdivided into twenty divisions.99  
Domestically, the CPI existed for just 10 months.100 Domestic war exhibits and 
inter-allied war expositions in nineteen cities totaled receipts of $1,432,261.36—
equivalent to $2.9 billion today. Artists produced 1,438 drawings. The division of 
Women’s War Work addressed information, which organized and directed women 
toward supporting the war effort.101 Still another division focused on rural, labor, 
religious, and periodical presses.102 Another division was tasked with preparing still 
photographs for distribution to the press numbering over 200,000 images. In addition, 
that division developed a permit system, which allowed civilian cameramen access to 
military activities.103  
More specific examples of CPI propaganda involved immigrant-targeted 
patriotism and anti-German messages. As Nancy Ford explains, the goal of immigrant 
propaganda was for “national and local nativists … to vanquish the immigrants’ Old 
World traditions,” so that foreign-born Americans might fall “victim to public demands 
for cultural conformity.”104 Posters in the immigrant neighborhoods played up this 
message: “‘Are you 100% American?’ ‘Prove it! Buy U.S. Government Bonds.’ Another 
Read: ‘Remember Your First Thrill of American Liberty—YOUR DUTY—Buy United 
States Government Bonds.’”105 These efforts rallied a growing portion of the American 
population with propaganda that was both patriotic and related to overall strategic 
messaging. Creel explains the film, The Immigrant, was “a direct appeal to the 
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immigrant, not only to become an American Citizen but to feel his responsibility as a 
citizen.”106Likewise, the film Columbia, “portrayed historical events in America and the 
growth of the democratic spirit of America that is now fighting the militaristic spirit of 
Germany.”107 Anti-German propaganda produced by the CPI was geared toward all and 
leveraged multiple avenues of influence. The Four-Minute men speeches “emphasized 
the dangerous ‘menace of Kaiserism.’”108 CPI pamphlets for elementary school children 
described the horrors the Germans inflicted on the French and Belgium people.109 On 
Liberty Loan Campaign posters, German “Huns” were depicted “as evil monsters who 
preyed on innocent women and children.”110 And finally, the film German Spies was “to 
expose the methods German propagandists in this country, to teach the public to refrain 
from talking carelessly, and to watch for those who are circulating rumors and false 
news.”111 
This propaganda endeavor, in support of the First World War, helped leverage 
America’s population of 103 million in 1917, with .04 percent taking up arms. According 
to the Department of Defense, 4.7 million Americans served in uniform112 Still, the 
government’s promotion of the war effort was not enough on its own, some say. Howard 
Zinn contends, “Despite the rousing words of Wilson about a war ‘to end all wars’ and 
‘to make the world safe for democracy,’ Americans did not rush to enlist. A million men 
were needed, but in the first six weeks after the declaration of war only 73,000 
volunteered. Congress voted overwhelmingly for a draft.”113In fact, the Selective Service 
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Act of 1917 did account for much of the initial U.S. mobilization, but the effect of 
propaganda for the remaining eight and a half months of war is born out by the final 
numbers.  
B. THE INTERWAR YEARS: A BACKLASH ON PROPAGANDA 
The irony of World War I, as far as propaganda goes, was that muckrakers not 
only failed to alert Americans to propaganda, but they created in the CPI a monster, with 
which they would eventually have to do battle.114 That point came in the interwar years. 
Michael Sproule explains, “Because leaders now viewed public opinion as decisive … 
‘the basic problem of democracy was to protect news—the source of public opinion—
from the taint of propaganda.’”115 Essentially power brokers realized that propaganda 
had been and would continue to be a powerful weapon in shaping public opinion and 
managing consent.  
Amid this concern, a desire for anti-propaganda education arose as part of the age 
of disillusionment and isolationism.116 The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) a 
short-lived institution that operated from 1937 to 1942 “presented the progressive 
movement with a widely recognized institutional platform for a democratic, anti-
propaganda critique.”117 The IPA existed during peacetime, but it is believed to have had 
an important role in shaping the way Americans saw propaganda once the United States 
joined the war. Coupled with the explosion in social sciences during the interwar period, 
the IPA inadvertently contributed to the singularly effective American propaganda during 
World War II.  
The IPA’s initial board of directors brought together progressive educators and 
activists: F. Ernest Johnson, Robert S. Lynd, James E. Mendenhall, Clyde R. Miller, and 
Robert K. Speer.118 Lynd was most immediately concerned with charting the classical 
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progressive view of the conflict between American democracy and special interests to 
leverage all forms of public intercourse.119 Lynd believed “the greatest problem of 
democracy was the gap between how free public choice was supposed to work and how, 
in the context of private interests, democracy actually did operate.”120 The IPA sought to 
understand the broader implications of propaganda and democracy, all the while desiring 
to remain detached from an inherent propagandization of their own findings. Miller 
further characterized propaganda as the work in which special interest groups engage.121 
His solution was for the IPA to act “to overcome the ‘chief danger of propaganda,’ which 
he believed was in its tendency to stimulate unreflective and emotional responses to 
problems.”122 The goal was to understand the relationship between propaganda and 
democracy—its inner working—while maintaining an academic infallibility in their 
results. Their desire was to provide and disseminate impartial scientific finding, which 
could not be labeled “propaganda.” Together, they “became a focal center in the effort to 
sort out the relationship of free speech and social survival, of democracy and 
propaganda.”123  
However, as World War II neared, the IPA worried less about anti-democratic 
rightwing elites leveraging media channels and focused more on foreign 
propagandists.124 As a consequence, the IPA came to be seen as a “too-skeptical 
bystander,” treating English and German propaganda as equally dangerous—all foreign 
propaganda posed a threat, according to the IPA.125 Prominent IPA members later tried to 
distinguish Allied propaganda as having some greater reliability or accuracy than its Axis 
counterpart, as “in a democracy, lies can be more readily exposed.”126 Still, critics and 
observers came to dismiss the IPA as fundamentally flawed in its inability to differentiate 
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between either forms moral credibility.127 Critics contended that the IPA’s broad view of 
propaganda meant that everyone who took a position on participation in WWII could be 
condemned as a propagandist.128In their desire to remain impartial, the IPA failed to 
recognize that publicizing a stance, any stance, does in reality constitute a form of 
propaganda. This hyper-sensitivity toward opinionated communication would eventually 
lead to the undoing of propaganda as a credible endeavor. 
The IPA ultimately could not surmount the external critique of its inability to 
produce unassailable scientific analysis of propaganda. In the end, its funding sources 
dried up.129 The final stance of IPA founder Kirtly Mather was that, “if democracy is not 
to perish from the earth, the average citizen must learn how to distinguish the plausible 
but false from the astonishing but true.”130 That was his dream. At that time, “many 
people wanted to take sides and take action to preserve democracies around the 
world.”131 The era of the IPA is important not only because it was devoted to 
understanding how propaganda functioned, but also it drove others to consider 
propaganda’s use. This increased public concern and scholarship, even when focused on 
the negative side of propaganda, led a large number of academics, journalists, and other 
assorted practitioners to discover the inner workings of propaganda’s theory and praxis. 
Arguably more deep thinkers than at any other time in American history focused 
specifically on propaganda. All were set to potentially influence World War II.   
C. WORLD WAR II 
We are fighting today for security, for progress and for peace, not only for 
ourselves, but for all men, not only for one generation but for all 
generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient 
ills. 
—President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
State of the Union Address,1942 
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The Second World War presented the United States with a critical problem. Not 
one, but three and more sovereign nations sought to upturn the balance of world 
power.132 American foreign policy initially remained isolationist, resembling the 
country’s positioning before World War I. Yet, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “Public 
opinion, in turn, shifted abruptly. Americans, regardless of their personal interests or 
political beliefs, shed their isolationist postures and quickly rallied behind the cause of 
war, or so the story goes.”133 All the rose-colored nostalgia of the present age aside, the 
so-called Greatest Generation, in fact, required much convincing about the merits of the 
world war.   
Even when shifts in public opinion seem situational, propaganda still plays a 
significant role. Political scientist Adam Berinsky contends, “The public might be briefly 
influenced by dramatic events, such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11, but—as in the domestic 
arena—public opinion is primarily structured by the ebb and flow of partisan and group-
based political conflict. These factors shape support for policies of war just as they shape 
policies of peace.”134 He further supports his argument with polling data that clearly 
shows an overwhelming majority of Americans prior to 1941 opposed U.S. support to the 
Allies.135As expected, a December 1941 poll taken after Pearl Harbor showed 87 percent 
opposed “any peace plan that preserved the European status quo.”136The reason, 
according to Berinsky, was “the realization of a policy that had been in the works for 
some time.”137An organized propaganda agency soon followed. It is important to note 
that even in the absence of organized propaganda, in the sense that it is synchronized and 
supports policy, the decision to enter into war and the public reaction supporting it had 
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been “the realization of long-term developments in political and military strategies on the 
part of partisan political actors.” Propaganda had been at play. 
Several governmental propaganda agencies formed in the years leading up to 
America’s involvement in World War II. In 1939, Roosevelt’s desire to establish an 
information bureau began with the Office of Government Reports (OGR), essentially “a 
press clipping service for all Washington agencies.”138 In 1941, the Division of 
Information in the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was created to coordinate 
all information from OEM agencies.139Also created in 1941, the Office of Civil Defense 
(OCD) “was to handle civilian protection, morale, and information.”140 Prior to Pearl 
Harbor, in fall of 1941, the president expanded the division of OCD charged with morale 
into the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), which was to “provide public samplings and 
give Americans an accurate and coherent account of government policy.”141 As these 
separate government agencies developed, they all struggled with being branded as 
propagandists. Still, “Congressmen and newspapermen overcame their natural suspicion 
of an official information agency and urged the creation of an organization to coordinate 
and release government information.”142 President Roosevelt was soon to act. 
In 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt did in seventy lines what Wilson 
had done in four, namely establishing a propaganda operation.143 The reason for pointing 
out this fact is that, while there can be no scientific correlation between the length of the 
executive order and the relative effectiveness of the ensuing propaganda operation, there 
may be a reason that the shorter message delivered more impact. The longer the 
document and the more abstract it becomes, the more likely it will create confusion 
among the audience. By extension, the more confusion among Americans, the less 
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effective the operation will be. Still, the CPI was incredibly effective during WWI, and 
the OWI successful in WWII. In comparison, contemporary scholars may ask how long 
such an executive order might be today to launch a program as effective as its historic 
predecessors. In this regard, simplicity may be key. The Office of War Information 
(OWI) was established through Executive Order 9182 on June 13, 1942, six months after 
the U.S. declaration of war; former CBS radio commentator Elmer Davis was chosen to 
head the agency.144 “The OWI had two main divisions: the Domestic Office, which, due 
to funding cuts, was virtually abolished a year after its creation; and the Overseas Branch, 
which placed itself under the control of Dwight Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, 
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF).”145 The 1945 U.S. Government Manual reads:  
The Domestic Operations Branch is responsible for coordinating and 
disseminating war information within the continental limits of the United 
States. It develops war information policies, coordinates the war 
information programs of Government agencies, and through the use of 
established communications facilities seeks to assure an accurate flow of 
war information to the public.146 
This mission was more easily described than executed. Davis and other leaders at 
the OWI, were almost immediately at odds in determining what information policy 
should be.147 A battle of sorts was waged within the OWI Domestic Branch between 
liberal Assistant Director Archibald MacLeish and his fellow assistant director, 
advertising executive Gardiner Cowles. MacLeish advocated not only fighting fascism, 
but also expressing a social agenda for the postwar era.148 Fighting fascism knew no 
party line, but social agenda proselytizing could and would alienate conservative 
members of Congress. With this approach, MacLeish and his supporters stepped over an 
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invisible political line; ultimately, this more muscular activism cost OWI director Davis 
not only positions within his bureau, but also funding from Congress.149 Their scenario 
reveals an important lesson. Partisan politics and successful propaganda campaigns 
directed domestically during total war do not mix.  
Sydney Weinberg explains, “Davis knew that propaganda and news had to be 
divorced, he was forced to rely heavily on advertising and radio executives to run the 
governments promotional campaigns to stimulate bond sales, waste-paper collection, and 
other activities.”150 Price Gilbert, an advertising executive familiar with poster 
advertising recognized the level of simplicity needed in poster design. He said, it “must 
be simple and direct because “high sounding words would lose the prospective 
audience.”151  
This point is where the liberal and capitalist propaganda cohorts diverge in 
methodology. The progressive liberals of the early twentieth century, and those 
developed over the next thirty years, saw themselves as highly educated and altruistic 
persons, individuals in search of fairness for all. In stark contrast were the capitalist ad-
men of Madison Avenue, who seek only profit. The conflict over propaganda 
methodology was based on ideology. The ad-men knew how to sell the product and 
produce results. Conflict was bound to occur. As graphics division chief, Francis Brennan 
told Davis about the valuable nature of using advertising techniques to reach an audience, 
saying, “Both you and Mr. Cowles have said that some advertising techniques are 
valuable. If by that you mean the fairly simple job of getting messages printed, 
distributed, and read, I agree. But if you mean psychological approaches, content, and 
ideas, I most firmly do not agree.”152 Ultimately, numerous liberal writers left the OWI. 
Davis reported to the president following their departure:  
Such a man is very apt to insist that he must proclaim the truth as he sees 
it; if you tell him that so long as he works for the Government he must 
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proclaim the truth as the President... [sees] it, he may feel that this is an in-
tolerable limitation on his freedom of thought and speech. In that case, he 
must go. . . . In an organization that is going to get any work done you 
cannot do much with people who are convinced that they are the sole 
authorized custodians of Truth.153  
As Weinberg states, a better way to address the problem would have been to explain from 
the beginning that autonomy would not be possible for the writers as it had in the past.154 
Such “independence of action was virtually incompatible with the function of a major 
government agency.”155 
In promoting propaganda, the government was charged with the difficult task of 
upholding freedom of the press; maintaining the intellectual high ground and refraining 
from outright black (dishonest) propaganda use; and actively informing the public of the 
forthcoming war without exposing secret military specifics. In this effort, a governmental 
report explains, “News to be released must be true, but also it must not give aid and 
comfort to the enemy. He [Roosevelt] added that the decision to release or not to release 
war news was up to the heads of the War and Navy Departments.”156 At first, the 
Secretaries for War, the Navy, and State were reluctant to support OWI’s efforts.157 
Eventually, the Army began to support Davis, and by mid-1942, so did the Navy, though 
the information was often slow in coming.158 Finally on September 1, 1943, at Davis’ 
urging, President Roosevelt drafted letters to the Navy and War departments, directing 
the release of information “whenever and however the OWI requested.”159 At the same 
time the Department of State was directed “to secure clearance and approval for all news 
releases” before issuance.160 Davis wanted only “to persuade the agencies that they have 
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got to do something which we can make intelligible.”161 Again Davis’ goal was to tell the 
truth and explain to the American people government policy in a way the majority could 
understand. Yet Davis also recognized that the OWI was not officially tasked with 
maintaining national morale.162 
So how did Davis do it? As Brewer explains, “To Hollywood, the OWI sent the 
Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry, asking it to consider, 
‘Will this picture help win the war?’”163 Specific examples of American propaganda 
praxis in total war illustrate the understanding that, “Millions must fight, produce, ration, 
conserve, and buy bonds.”164 Interventionist Hollywood producers released films like, 
Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), Foreign Correspondent (1940), and Sergeant York 
(1941), which portrayed a simple country boy’s struggle with conscience and the biblical 
commandment “thou shalt not kill.”165 As Koppes and Black explain, “Combat films 
reflected OWI's influence probably as much as any type. In the bureau's ideal combat 
movie an ethnically and geographically diverse group of Americans would articulate 
what they were fighting for, pay due regard to the role of the Allies, and battle an enemy 
who was formidable but not a superman.”166 In addition to films, radio broadcasts, 
posters, and magazine artwork all played a role in mass persuasion.  
In the end, this propaganda endeavor in support of the Second World War helped 
leverage an American population in 1941 of 133 million, with 12 percent of the 
population taking up arms. According to the Department of Defense, 16 million served in 
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uniform.167 As in the First World War, compulsory service in the form of the Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940 was enacted, so enlistment numbers may not be a direct 
result of propaganda, though many consider its implementation in WWII successful.  
In the final days of the war, just before the official surrender of Japan on 
September 2, 1945, the OWI came to a necessary and inglorious end. Executive Order 
9608 signed by President Harry S. Truman on August 31 abolished the domestic 
functions and portions of the foreign branch to the State Department.168 Both Roosevelt 
and Truman realized the politically toxic nature of domestic propaganda and the useful 
nature of foreign propaganda.  Roosevelt did not want a centralized propaganda 
mechanism at all; it was only in the wake of widespread confusion within the public’s 
eyes, that advisors finally convinced him.169 An organized domestic propaganda machine 
surely played a role. Truman even thanked Davis, the OWI director, for “an outstanding 
contribution to victory.”170  
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IV. LIMITED WAR 1946–1989 
The Korean War and the Vietnam War, conflicts that occurred in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s during the Cold War, were limited wars. Neither is generally seen as a 
win for the U.S.; Korea typically is viewed as a draw and Vietnam, a loss. Yet, the United 
States and its propaganda did win the all-encompassing Cold War. The contrasts between 
the public perception of the larger Cold War strategy and the propaganda specific to the 
Korean and Vietnam wars brings into relief the dynamics of policy, propaganda, and 
Clausewitz’s trinity in one nuclear age.  
Callum MacDonald explains, “Communism was regarded as a political threat, to 
be contained by economic aid to key areas on the Soviet periphery which would restore 
prosperity and eliminate the conditions in which communism flourished.”171 Moreover, 
“the only way to deal with Stalin was from a position of military strength. NSC-68 
advocated rearmament, both atomic and conventional. . . . Communism was to be rolled 
back, not only in the Soviet bloc but also in Russia itself.”172 While foreign propaganda 
extends outside the realm of this paper, the program of communist propaganda leveraged 
against European communists and Westerners alike marks a significant and effective 
campaign. Nathan Leites’ study of Bolshevik operational code explains that, “in the eyes 
of the Bolsheviks, ‘the only safe enemy is the one whose power has been completely 
destroyed.’”173 This view framed Moscow’s propaganda.174 
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A. THE COLD WAR 
As Osgood explains, a generation of American military professionals and 
politicians alike had grown up in the age of propaganda expansion and technological 
advances of total war, and they realized the power of psychological warfare as an 
“indispensible element of modern warfare.”175 They agreed that the American people 
needed to be agitated and organized with the same level of attention as provided to 
military troops; public relations and propaganda would fill these requirements.176 Osgood 
further explains, “Propaganda advocates championed ‘a strategy of truth,’ but they also 
conceded that lies, media manipulation, and the withholding of information were 
necessary for national security.”177 It should be noted that Osgood is explaining the 
understanding of leaders during the epoch of total war of how the Cold War may need to 
be fought. They accepted the reality of propaganda’s effectiveness.  
The bipolar conflict that followed World War II was as much a war of the mind as 
the earlier conflicts in that it was a contest of ideologies.178 Taylor explains, “As a 
consequence, international diplomacy appeared to be developing by the 1950s into a 
great game of bluff, counter-bluff, and double bluff all set against a climate of terror.”179 
Policymakers struggled to explain to the public the need for large peacetime defense 
expenditures for the foreseeable future.180 The Red Bolshevik menace provided the 
necessary enemy, and at the root of this propagandist boon was fear.181 Propaganda 
reaffirmed that the enemy was indeed, “genuine, legitimate, and justified.”182  
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The Smith-Mundt Act passed in 1948 and “legalized the first peacetime 
propaganda program in the United States.”183  As Osgood explains the role of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) this way: 
“Through the use of the USIA, CIA, and other mechanisms, the United States waged a 
war of words to influence friends, woo neutrals, and alienate enemies.”184 This reasoning 
is nearly identical with the prior total wars. On the other hand, the nature of public 
opinion was inescapable, and what policymakers coined “psychological strategy” sought 
“the shaping of policies to influence the thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, and actions of 
public opinion at home and abroad.”185  
During this era, the United States essentially made a distinct change in its view of 
propaganda by delineating the difference between propaganda and information. The 
latter, historian David Welch believes, “seeks to transmit facts objectively.”186 
Government officials used all manner of terms interchangeably. Precision and specificity 
were lost, arguably to the future detriment of the U.S. policy, strategy, and propaganda 
paradigm. As Osgood further explains, “The idea of propaganda as information 
conformed to the view psychological warfare planners had of themselves.”187 They 
believed that they were informing, not propagandizing, but as Edward Bernays would 
likely agree, they were indeed propagandizing, and more specifically were engaged in 
black propaganda, which relies on mistruth.  
A blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign propaganda emerged in this 
period. Most importantly, “Total war made distinctions between propaganda intended for 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ audiences meaningless.”188 As such, white propaganda 
was subverted, renamed psychological strategy, and directed expressly at Americans.189  
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B. KOREA 
Within public view, America told South Koreans, “You are not alone. You will 
never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of 
human freedom.”190 This statement and an analysis by the CIA concluding that North 
Korea was, indeed, “a tightly controlled Soviet satellite” clearly led to a perception that 
the USSR had made a conscious decision to escalate the Cold War.191 The Korean War 
marked a watershed moment in that “it sparked the emergence of the national security 
state to oversee a militarized version of global containment.”192 In other words, it served 
to implement NSC-68, which, in turn, framed the political and civilian views from the 
perspective of war aims and the commensurate level of fear.193  
At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, President Truman was not in a 
hurry to begin mobilization, hence no large-scale domestic propaganda program to 
leverage war production and monetary support. As part of this low-key response, Truman 
sought to keep a tight grip on official statements.194 As America’s lack of military 
preparedness for Korea became a leading focus of the media, Truman sought to bring 
public debate under his control.195 Attacks from the right led him to fire not only 
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, but also eventually General Douglas MacArthur. 
Finally, Truman decided to “establish some sort of propaganda agency.”196  He entered 
robust debate and consultation with Elmer Davis, the former OWI director, Truman’s 
press secretary, and the press chiefs from the State Department, Pentagon, and National 
Security Resource Board.  
They ultimately decided that the earlier agencies—the CPI and OWI—had been 
needed to prosecute total war. Because Korea was shaping up as a limited war, the effort 
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did not require its own propaganda agency.197 Instead, Truman adopted a do-it-yourself 
approach to managing messaging and informational coherence. For example, he sought to 
rally support for the administration’s mobilization policy by intoning: “All of us—
whether we are farmers, or wage earners, or businessmen—must give up some of the 
things we would ordinarily expect to have for ourselves and our families.”198 
The provisional and sometimes improvised messages disappointed the public and 
its expectations. By February 1951, the State Department’s Office of Public Affairs 
noted, “The American people are still demanding ‘leadership’ from the administration by 
which they mean clear, forceful enunciation of our policies.”199 Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson urged the president to articulate his policy goals more clearly and forcefully, lest 
the Republicans dominate the narrative and thereby influence public opinion against 
Korean involvement.200 For Truman, however, only the outbreak of a new world war 
could necessitate a new OWI.201 
The notorious Senator Joseph McCarthy was decidedly more successful at raising 
the necessary national ire against communism. Originally emanating from the “Senate’s 
Internal Security Committee and the House of Representative’s Un-American Activities 
Committee (HUAC) . . . the sordid McCarthyite ‘witch-hunts’ of the early 1950s, this 
campaign created a climate of fear in which sympathy for the ‘Enemy’ was equated with 
sympathy for the Devil.”202 Unfortunately for Truman, McCarthy’s endeavors scarred the 
domestic political landscape.203 Subsequent political rhetoric evidences the damage done 
by McCarthyism. Senator William Jenner asked, “How can we get the Reds out of Korea 
if we cannot get them out of Washington?”204 In the end, McCarthy’s public hearings and 
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search for communists in the State Department and Hollywood led President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower to establish the United States Information Agency.205 David Guth explains,  
Both Truman and Eisenhower were uneasy about using the propaganda 
tactics employed first by the Nazis and then by the Communists. At the 
same time, neither man did a particularly good job of articulating this view 
to either the public or to people within their administrations.206 
The USIA therefore promoted “U.S. national interests through a variety of international 
information, education, and cultural programs.”207 
C. VIETNAM 
Years before the Vietnam War, propaganda was repackaged. In the wake of the 
USIA’s emergence in 1953, they began referring to government mass persuasion 
campaigns as “public diplomacy”: 
The United States government has backed away from that terminology 
since an initial flirtation with it at the outbreak of the First World War. In 
what is a common government tactic, officials have attached the label 
"public diplomacy" to the effort to influence foreign public opinion. 
However, few are fooled by the use of creative language. USIA veteran 
Fitzhugh Green acknowledged in his 1988 book American Propaganda 
Abroad that public diplomacy is "a euphemism for the word modern 
Americans abhor—propaganda.208 
The new terminology indicated a new—and increasingly fraught—relationship between 
the U.S. government and its citizens. Author and war analyst Harry G. Summers wrote, 
“The student draft deferments, along with the decision not to ask for a declaration of war 
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and not to mobilize our reserve forces, were part of a deliberate Presidential policy not to 
arouse the passions of the American people.”209  
Furthermore, the limited nature of the Vietnam War was an intentional policy, an 
outgrowth of the limited war theories, which were “noteworthy for their lack of 
passion.”210 This aspect of the war manifested itself in the official verbiage and trickled 
into the military mindset. Battlefield reports were cast in different terms. Instead of 
killing the enemy and destroying his means for making war, the military was “inflicting 
casualties” and “neutralizing targets.”211 Steeped in a misunderstanding of the nature of 
warfare, the policy and propaganda produced to support U.S. involvement all were 
lacking. “The line between reporting the facts militarily and justifying the war politically 
became steadily more blurred, and the military increasingly began to symbolize a 
misguided policy,” according to one scholar.212As a result of these blurred justifications 
and misguided policies, the military and the efforts to propagandize were both weakened.   
As Osgood explains, several domestic organizations, complemented foreign 
propaganda organizations like the USIA and the CIA. The Federal Civil Defense 
Administration conducted in depth propaganda operations directed at Americans; their 
primary imperative was to psychologically prepare Americans for a long term Cold War 
and arms race.213 But the USIA and its Voice of America broadcasts loomed especially 
large in U.S. propaganda efforts.214 Most notably, “[t]he USIA  . . .  released a large body 
of propaganda that took the form of news, but that was used in the service of 
persuasion.”215  
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News from a trusted source like the USIA can have an immediate effect on its 
audience, especially when perceived “as a neutral, objective activity.”216 It is what 
communications expert Shawn J. Perry-Giles terms camouflaged propaganda. As such, 
its inherent believability divined from its trusted source makes it a particularly powerful 
force in a democratic society. Unlike foreign totalitarian propaganda, it is less likely to 
bring about critical response.217 The problem is when black and otherwise misleading 
propaganda begins to look very similar to U.S. news reporting. Osgood writes:  
The parallels between the stories generated by the Information Agency 
and those that appeared “spontaneously” in the American press are 
striking. It is difficult to identify precisely which stories were planted, 
which ones journalists derived from government press releases, and which 
ones arose independently of the administration’s efforts.218 
During the Vietnam War, Americans were increasingly subject to these kinds of news 
stories. As Taylor explains, “Psychological operations were, then, no longer being 
confined to the traditional battlefield, for the battlefield had become the global 
information environment,” and in the Vietnam War “the major propaganda battle was not 
to be fought in theater itself but on the domestic front.”219  
The Kennedy administration, 1961–1963, successfully managed domestic 
information and reduced public knowledge of the increasing American footprint in 
Vietnam, but as the death toll began to rise, this level of control could not last.220 
Strategic, domestic muddle in the Johnson years (1963–1968) exacerbated the problem. 
“Following President [John F.] Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, President 
[Lyndon] Johnson inherited a confusing situation as American policymakers struggled to 
define America’s purpose in Vietnam.”221 Propagandists could have helped, but Johnson 
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waited until the 1964 election before announcing or enacting any big plans.222 The 
Johnson administration’s information strategy was “to pursue low-level, incremental 
announcements of the military build-up: the steps toward a major war were therefore 
difficult to discern.”223 The steps toward a categorical failure of “public diplomacy”—or 
any other kind of propaganda—were rather more prominent. Caroline Page explains,  
Johnson’s secrecy (and duplicity) over fashioning and implementing 
Vietnam policy, away from public scrutiny, followed by his attempt to 
wage war ‘quietly’—in order to avoid both probable dissension over 
fighting a land war in Asia and the need to drum up public support with 
the attendant possibility of ‘war hysteria’ (either of which might result in 
public pressure on the Administration concerning its war policies), as well 
as to protect his ‘Great Society’ programme—had well and truly 
backfired.224 
Historian Larry Schweikart, contends that Johnson’s conscious decision to wage war 
quietly, so as not to detract from “ambitious social programs,” led to a disastrous wartime 
strategy.225 Johnson’s stance—coupled with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s 
proclivity for numbers as the true measure of combat effectiveness—did not support a 
clear case that the country should attempt to prevent Communist expansion into 
Vietnam.226 Schweikart writes, “By conceding that the administration did not even want 
the public to view the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong—who were killing American 
sons—as the enemy, McNamara ceded the entire propaganda campaign to the 
communists and their allies.”227  
As a result, individuals like Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann appeared. Vann 
was a U.S. military advisor to Saigon in 1963, who, following the Battle of Ap Bac, did 
not contain his drive to “convince the military and political leadership in Washington, 
that the only way the United States could avoid being beaten in Vietnam was to 
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drastically change strategy and coerce the Saigon side into accepting direction from him 
and the other American officers in the field.”228 In his attempt to change strategy, Vann’s 
avenue for disseminating information were New York Times reporters David Halberstam 
and Neil Sheehan, rather than the official chain of command. The media was highly 
critical of the commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General 
Paul Harkins. Because he overstated successes in Vietnam, the press referred to him as 
General Blimp.229 Reflecting on comments given by Harkins about the Viet Cong forces 
supposedly at Ap Bac, which Sheehan knew were not there, Sheehan explains, “[Harkins] 
was convinced of the truth of these assertions that angered us because we interpreted 
them as an insult to our intelligence.”230 This dispute about the need and effects of 
propaganda in every sense marks the beginning of the credibility gap occurring at the 
operational, tactical levels of war. 
General William Westmoreland, MACV commander from 1964–1968, saw the 
media as the enemy.231 Westmoreland and many officers like him saw the media as 
deleterious and operating counter to military objectives by sapping public support with 
graphic images and sensational reporting from the front. It is notable though that Vann, 
an Army officer, viewed the problem as a result of policy and strategy—not the media. 
He arguably saw the media as a tool for forcing policy and strategy revision, not as the 
cause for reducing American public support. Author Thomas Rid explains the problem: 
“Because the hard facts on the wars progress were so hard to produce, the military 
became increasingly involved in the business of justifying and selling the war.  The line 
between reporting the facts militarily and justifying the war politically became steadily 
more blurred, and the military increasingly began to symbolize a misguided policy.”232 
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To be sure, nightly news coverage on American television played its role in the 
development of the conflict from military assistance, to engagement, to war.233 
In Vietnam, the “five o’clock follies” were meant to inform much the way that 
television in the United States did. Official press briefings from MACV directed at 
reporters working in Vietnam, the follies were meant to convey the day’s military 
achievements. The problem arose when MACV reports did not align with firsthand 
recollections of combat events. For example, if a soldier went on combat patrol, and the 
enemy engaged suffered three killed in action, but the MACV reported twenty killed in 
action, the MACV lost its credibility and its relevance as a truthful news source. The 
credibility gap then necessarily widened between the public strategic narrative and the 
reality of actual ground combat, as seen by the reporters and troops alike.234 
In 1968, the credibility gap came home to roost.  Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings, chaired by J. William Fulbright, looked at American policy in 
Vietnam. The hearings came in response to the strategic narrative by the U.S. military 
and the onset of the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong. The strategic narrative touted U.S. 
military success, while downplaying Viet Cong effectiveness, yet the Viet Cong had 
actually launched an expansive, well-coordinated offensive operation all over Vietnam—
something they were supposedly unable to do. While the offensive had ultimately been a 
defeat for the Viet Cong, it was an operational surprise for the U.S. Beginning with the 
legal justification for escalation, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, “Senator Albert Gore Sr. 
of Tennessee warned in an executive session: ‘If this country has been misled, if this 
committee, this Congress, has been misled by pretext into a war in which thousands of 
young men have died, and many more thousands have been crippled for life, and out of 
which their country has lost prestige, moral position in the world, the consequences are 
very great.’”235Though there may have been certain liberties taken with intelligence 
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during the Tonkin incident, this testimony took place amid an air of skepticism over the 
war. Senator Fulbright exclaimed, “Give the country an opportunity to know what is 
going on.”236  
The era culminated with Daniel Ellsberg releasing the Pentagon Papers in 1971. 
The New York Times published the official documents in which the Defense Department 
laid out its plan to deceive the American public about how badly the war was going. At 
this point, the black propaganda consumed the entire agenda.237 Geunter Levy explains 
that selected excerpts from the Pentagon Papers, including those published in The New 
York Times, “have made it appear the while Johnson projected himself as the peace 
candidate, the administration in 1964 had decided to wage overt war in Vietnam and was 
merely holding back with the escalation until after the election in November.”238 
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 328, which the Pentagon Papers 
referred to as a pivotal document, marked the President’s acceptance of U.S. offensive 
ground operations.239 In 1965, the president had stated to reporters, “I know of no far-
reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated.” The Pentagon Papers revealed 
that Johnson was not completely honest about the situation. He was then accused of 
“calculated deceit.”240  
Levy explains, “The government in its pronouncements spoke of success and light 
at the end of the tunnel, but continued to dispatch additional troops while casualties 
mounted steadily,” to which Leslie Gelb adds, “[O]ptimism without results could only 
work for so long; after that, it had to produce a credibility gap.”241 By the time Nixon 
arrived, propaganda—in fact, any kind of official information project—had now become 
exactly the thing that the progressives had feared.   
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V. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
The way a nation wages war—the role allotted to the people in defending 
the country and the purposes for which it fights—testifies to the actual 
character of its political system.  
—Andrew Bacevich 
Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed 
Their Soldiers and Their Country 
Following September 11, 2001, American foreign policy and military strategy 
took a decidedly ambiguous turn for the worse. The attacks on the continental United 
States started a counter-terror war that stirred up ideas, politics, society, culture, and 
military institutions. The policy strategy for this new war failed to rise to the rhetoric of 
total war from the twentieth century, given the country’s neoliberal approach to policy at 
the time. Moreover, Americans remained generally confused about the character of 
political violence, as seen through the materialist, neoliberal worldview that had grown 
more common since the 1970s. As military historian Hew Strachan explains, “They 
[governments generally] may adapt and refine these policies in the light of circumstance 
and as they implement them. (In this respect, of course, war shapes policy, not the other 
way around.) But a policy, at least in its idealized form, remains a statement of one 
government’s intent.”242  
Thus, propaganda derived from a non-policy is faulty because it is not 
synchronized with the political or strategic aims or plans of the government. The 
government cannot expect mass media to communicate sound, effective propaganda if 
they are not presented with a coherent message in the first place. Strachan further 
explains, “The ‘global war on terror’ was astrategic (if such a word exists). That is, it was 
un-strategic or non-strategic. Its declared objective was to eliminate a means of fighting 
and a form of political violence of a generalized sort, not to achieve a political goal.”243 
Military strategy especially in its limited form and in its twenty-first–century guise 
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therefore, “has to rest on an understanding of war and war’s nature because it will shape 
policy.”244 This issue has been the problem of policy and strategy with the war on terror. 
“Terrorism was not invented on 9/11. It is a means to wage war not an objective of war: 
this is why the ‘global war on terror’ was so strategically illiterate.”245 Finally, as 
Strachan explains, “By confusing strategy with policy, and by calling what were in reality 
political effects strategic effects, governments denied themselves the intellectual tool to 
manage war for political purposes, and so allowed themselves to project their daily 
political concerns back onto strategy.”246  
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE ENEMY 
As Der Derian explains, the only missing piece was an enemy, so the “virtual 
enemy” had to suffice in the interim.247 Propagandists still needed an enemy to vilify for 
their messages to be effective. This enigmatic enemy was not easily identified. The 
understanding of the underlying propagandist methodology for dehumanizing the enemy 
is not the problem, but it does relate to the hatred side of the Clausewitzian trinity.  
The United States faced a nearly insurmountable problem in trying to characterize 
the Islamists as enemies of the past would have been characterized. Communism, 
fascism, authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism are not religious “isms.” (Susan 
Carruthers asks how a country conducts war on a tactic and how such an open-ended, 
rhetorically imprecise conflict can be directed at an individual, organization, idea, or 
entire religion.248) Given the American value of religious freedom, the government 
struggles to frame the Islamic terrorists in religious terms, though they are not driven by 
political means per se and clearly employ their religious beliefs to bring harm. The 
present enemy is motivated by religious means directed toward a political end.  
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In the case of the global war on terror, Steuter and Wells further posit that the 
inflammatory language was directed at all Muslims. “This dehumanization of an entire 
group or race encourages an unconscious transformation, the imaginative transference 
that is metaphor’s chief function . . . and by which entire populations are collectively 
stripped of their humanity.” This approach is no more helpful than it is accurate.  The 
actual enemy remains an inchoate and scattered group of Islamist terrorists. They are 
essentially stateless, though they rely on other countries to host training. The states 
harboring them, knowingly or unknowingly, risk reprisal actions by Western powers. In 
addition, radical Islamists present a further challenge in the context of war in that they are 
bound by and motivated by their religion. 
In the global war on terror, the methodology of how propaganda dehumanizes the 
enemy continues to hold up, but the enemy itself is not one that can be effectively 
dehumanized. By its very nature, Islamic terrorism exists as an exceptional example, a 
religious group seeking a political end. In cases where the enemy represents a divergent 
and abhorrent political ideology, rather than a religious ideology, they are far more easily 
targeted. America cannot countenance religious persecution, even if members of that 
particular persuasion employ terrorist acts against innocents. Given the complicated 
problems with characterizing the enemy for destruction, Americans find themselves 
asking, “What is it that this war actually seeks to achieve?” 
B. WAR AIMS 
On October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush announced in an address to the 
nation strikes against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He said: “Initially, the terrorists may 
burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also 
designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive, and relentless operations to 
drive them out and bring them to justice.”249 Steuter and Wells state that media framing 
in the months after the attack took on a distinctly propagandist nature, “This framing 
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uncritically replicated the model proposed by the Bush administration and the American 
military, in which the September 11 attacks were depicted as initiating a retaliatory war 
on terror.”250 
The war aims within the broader global war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq 
changed over the course of the war. The aims in Afghanistan were as follows: the desire 
to kill the terrorists responsible for September 11 and disrupt their training camps in 
Afghanistan; to unseat the Taliban; to install a western-friendly government (Karzai); to 
build a stable democracy in Afghanistan; to man, train, and equip security forces to 
maintain the sovereignty of the newly formed Afghan government; and to continue 
fighting an active insurgency. Operation Iraqi Freedom’s evolving war aims were: the 
desire to remove weapons of mass destruction WMDs and the inherent national security 
threat they pose to the United States; to unseat and bring to justice Saddam Hussein and 
key figures in the Baath party; to build a new coalition government; to man, train, and 
equip a new Iraqi security force to help maintain the newly formed government; and to 
continue fighting an active insurgency in the country. The war aims, as Strachan posits, 
necessarily affected the policy that sought these ends. Propaganda and the media fell in 
line with these aims and supported them as well.  
National security analyst Anthony Cordesman explains that the United States did 
not focus on terrorism once it had forced the Taliban from Afghanistan.251 
Approximately three months after 9/11, when the CIA and Special Operations Forces had 
driven Osama Bin Laden and the last vestiges of Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, the United 
States subsequently decided to seek international coalition directed at developing a 
democratic Afghanistan.252 Aside from the problem of the Taliban and Al Qaeda not 
being defeated, the official focus was no longer on war and  terrorism as the enemy. 
Cordesman explains, “They were nation-building efforts whose failures forced them to 
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include major counterinsurgency campaigns.”253 Brown explains, “Although the 
literature tends to place weight on the ability of military and governmental actors to shape 
the news media’s access to information, it should be recognized that these efforts at 
management are happening in an environment where technology is working against that 
control.”254 
Colonel Thomas Cioppa explains that in 2004 the Defense Science Board (DSB) 
reported on military strategic communications.  
The DSB report highlighted that strategic communication is an important 
component of U.S. national security and required transformation. In 
addition, the DSB report states that: strategic communication requires a 
sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, 
identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on ‘doable 
tasks,’ develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, 
leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success.255 
This statement from the DSB specifically addressed Multi-Nation Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 
operations, but carried a similar intent, form, and function as propaganda conducted by 
the CPI and the OWI did in an earlier era. The CPI and OWI conducted all of the 
methodology advocated by the DSB on a national level, as well as a theater level. The 
goal of this methodology was to synchronize the strategic narrative from all reporting 
sources to further national policy goals and direct that strategic narrative to domestic, 
allied, and neutral foreign audiences. It did not take the onus for military information 
management away from the military; it simply synchronized and supported their efforts. 
Military and domestic reporting became largely congruent, and CPI and OWI made every 
effort to prevent conflict in their intent. 
Such an alignment of messaging in the United States did not take place 
throughout the global war on terror, but an alignment remains possible. One occurred 
from 2008 to 2009 in the surge and process of disengagement from Iraq. As Cioppa 
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explains, the alignment of key messages, “or coordination, coupled with the requirement 
for accuracy, was central to the shaping of the media information environment.”256 The 
focal point was the “pace of progress and security conditions,” and the means for 
message discipline and synchronization was guidance provided by General David 
Petraeus and supported by the hierarchical structure of the military.257 
Still as Cioppa explains, “During August and September 2007, the Western media 
similarly had a larger percentage of OIF security-related stories, vice diplomatic, 
economic, or political OIF-related stories.”258 Stories developed by the media tended to 
veer from the desired focus of ground commanders regarding war progress to security 
conditions. While journalists aspire to impart truthful information, their sense of news 
judgment also requires a consideration of certain factors in selecting what stories to 
report. An amount of sensationalization drives viewership and ratings, and in the end, 
journalists are held accountable by editorial management, and ultimately their 
shareholders and advertisers. The carnage caused by improvised explosive devices 
receives more media attention than the many wells dug, schools built, and roads made 
passable. Such is a normal part of how the press works and a reflection of human nature 
and human interest. These factors exist as impediments to the goals of propaganda and 
mass persuasion.  Cioppa contends, “This does not imply that MNF–I considered the 
media wrong for covering these stories since they were an important element of OIF, but 
instead reflected its desire that the media agenda incorporate more stories highlighting 
progress and stability in Iraq.”259  
C. THE REALITY GAP 
In contemplating the role of the American public during the GWOT, Bacevich 
argues that Americans accepted three axioms:  
• First, we will not change. 
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• Second, we will not pay. 
• Third, we will not bleed.260 
The first premise related to the stance of the president’s remarks in the wake of 
September 11. Terrorist attacks should not deter the American people from living their 
normal lives. To do otherwise would be to fall victim to terrorism and render it 
successful. Hence, Americans should refuse to accept a reordering of national security 
priorities.261The second point referenced the economic restrictions and cost of going to 
war. In this war, Americans would not be forced to make a decision between guns and 
butter. That dichotomy was neither necessary nor acceptable.262 Finally, participation in 
the war was based solely on volunteerism. Essentially, sacrifice and civic duty became 
the realm of individual conscience. Participation was neither expected nor required.263 
Bacevich states, “As a consequence, war became exclusively the province of the state 
rather than the country as a whole.”264  
These axioms limited Americans’ physical and emotional investment in the 
outcome of war, thereby shaping their perception of information and propaganda at the 
time. Gil Merom explains, “Democracies ‘fail in small wars,’ he maintains, ‘because they 
find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can 
secure victory.’”265Moreover he states, “In a nutshell, then, the profound answer to the 
puzzle involves the nature of the domestic structure of democracies and the ways by 
which it interacts with ground military conflict in insurgency situations.”266The 
American public played a role in the global war on terror, though it was being actively 
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fought far from their borders. The relationships between democracy and war, and 
between domestic and foreign policy, pose an issue.267Furthermore, he explains, 
“democratic failure in small wars can be seen as reflecting a two-level game in which the 
‘win set’—exceeds what a critical domestic constituency accepts. Because of the 
preferences of this constituency and its capacity to effectively exercise political power at 
home . . . the state’s foreign policy is not ‘ratified’ and the war effort becomes 
unsustainable.”268  
If the domestic center of gravity, the public, is not brought into the fold to invest 
in the decision, prosecution, and sacrifice war entails, it is then unlikely to yield victory. 
Brewer explains that, “The consequences of such a ‘reality gap’ between the staged war 
and the actual war were severe. The administration put more effort into producing the 
staged war than planning and carrying out the real one . . . Officials, like the best 
salesmen who believe in their product, fooled themselves with their own lies and 
exaggerations.”269A strained military struggling to accomplish flawed war aims, a 
diminished U.S. reputation worldwide, and a deleterious wartime policy affecting civil 
liberties and democratic process loomed large.270In the wake of diminished public 
support for the GWOT, government-contracted strategic publicist John Rendon 
explained, “We lost control of the context . . . That has to be fixed for the next war.”271 
Others corroborate his conclusion. “In short, until policy-makers, militaries, the media 
and their publics ask of politically motivated violence ‘publicity to what end?,’ wars on 
terror will continually flounder,” said Carruthers.272 
D. THE WAR OF IDEAS 
Mass morale, propaganda, and mobilization relate to underlying tensions between 
policy and strategy. Both must be lucidly developed to leverage propaganda and to bring 
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the media to play a role in selling the resulting strategic narrative. Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba explain:  
If a political system is to be effective . . . there must be mechanisms 
whereby governmental officials are endowed with the power to make 
authoritative decisions . . . Wars, for instance (hot or cold), have often 
shifted the balance so far in the direction of governmental power and 
authority as to cause concern about the preservation of democratic 
responsiveness. Yet if the balance is not so shifted, it is argued that 
democratic governments may succumb to external challenges.273 
Essentially, Almond and Verba maintain that “the ordinary citizen must turn power over 
to elites and let them rule.”274 The case for global war on terror is one such example in 
which the elites and the mass inflated the threat, limited the means of resistance, and 
overstated aims. Before September 11, James Der Derian claims, “Bush, Cheney, and 
Rumsfeld early on signaled their intention to fully operationalize virtuous war . . . they 
viewed virtuous war as the ultimate means by which the United States would re-secure its 
borders, maintain its hegemony, and bring order and justice to international politics.”275 
Prior to open conflict, military strategy is developed according to this policy.  
After the September 11 attacks, in a time of conflict, as Steuter and Wells 
contend, “language assumes a role of heightened importance.”276 While they see the 
importance of language in conflict to arouse the public to support war, they fail to 
recognize the inherent nature of the media and the public to accept the government’s 
framing of events in the wake of a national tragedy. As the public becomes aware of 
governmental policy by means of information release—whether in the form of official 
press releases or by media reports largely derived from governmental and military 
sources—all these sources can be considered propaganda, as they seek to bring about a 
certain behavior.  
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The framing of war chronology and enemies evolves over time as propaganda 
develops. Steuter and Wells contend, “As theorists of enemy-construction . . . agree, what 
is reflected in and created by language is not reality but construct, something conditioned 
and assembled, put together from fragments of information and observation and shaped 
by the contexts of their assembly.”277 The majority of mainstream media content during 
times of conflict is developed in concert with governmental and military sources, which 
explains why initial reporting on the war took on this propagandist approach.278  
The citizens who understand the need for their nation to enter into open conflict 
with another nation, especially when their nation finds itself in a dire struggle for 
existence, typically understand the need to drive public perception in the furtherance of 
national war aims. Essentially propaganda serves not only a useful purpose, but also a 
necessary one.  
E. MISUNDERSTANDING THE MISUNDERSTANDING 
Propaganda, information management, strategic communication, and the broader 
enterprise tasked with explaining government policy to the public during time of war is 
never easy. Even with clearly delineated guidance from the president, it is difficult. 
Fraught with political pitfalls, propaganda is often seen by the party not in power as a 
potential threat and can be charged with spreading falsehoods and mistruths. Aspects 
evidenced in the historic case studies can, in all likelihood, produce desired results. As 
was noted in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis report on the Enduring Lessons 
from the Past Decades of War, the battle for the strategic narrative is paramount to 
success.279 A lack of understanding of the actual enemy affects policy and strategy, 
according to Emile Simpson. “This is what happens when an operational approach is up 
scaled to the level of strategy, or policy: when operational ideas, which demand a 
political context, are not adequately provided with one, they move to fill the vacuum.”280  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In major combat operations, the U.S. was successful in employing military 
power; however, other instruments of national power (diplomatic, 
information, and economic) became more important as operations shifted 
away from major combat. 
—Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 
Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of 
Operations 
Propaganda relies on the ability to define the enemy. In WWI, the enemy was 
Germany. In WWII, the enemy was fascism, Nazism, and eventually the German people. 
In the Cold War, the enemy was the Communism. The global war on terror in the twenty-
first century lacks a clearly defined enemy. Is it the fundamentalist Islamist or terrorists 
generally? If it is the latter, how will they be identified and brought to justice? And is this 
possible on a global scale? Is terrorism a policing problem or a problem for the military? 
Regardless of propaganda’s efficacy in delivering its message and affecting 
behavior, it fails to deliver the desired strategic effect without corresponding policy and 
strategy. Strategy as an extension of policy is critical.  Until open hostilities occur and the 
force of military conflict begins to have an affect on further political policy development, 
initial non-abstract policy is critical. Additionally, technology is not a catch-all solution. 
It is part of the solution, but demographic factors, such as religion, culture, and gender, 
also comprise part of the solution. Technology does not ensure warfare’s success, nor 
does properly constructed propaganda.  But either, done right, certainly can help. 
A. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND PROPAGANDA 
Understanding the relationship between policy, strategy, and propaganda is the 
key.  An understanding of this relationship allows the government to determine strategy 
in close consultation with policy makers, the military, and propagandists. Underlying 
strategy must be able to be directed and explained in concrete, easy-to-understand terms. 
Otherwise, the government risks abstraction and likely misinterpretation by the American 
public. Misinterpretation brings about a negative strategic effect—as was the case with 
 64 
the Goetz medal around the time of WWI and the Abu Ghraib torture videos during the 
Iraq War. Moreover, strategic narrative, which explains the conduct of war, needs to be 
infallible in the eyes of allies and neutrals. Taylor explains:  
Wars are not caused solely, or even mainly, by propaganda. They are 
caused by people in power who have to balance possible risks against 
potential gains in order to achieve their aims by means other than peaceful 
ones. Once they have balanced the risks, then the propaganda comes into 
play. Propaganda can escalate a conflict but it usually comes after policy 
has been decided.281 
Despite the range of terms and forms—strategic communication, public affairs, 
public relations, advertising, and so on—analysis of wartime communication can 
recognize all as propaganda. It is, as Lasswell states, “a mere tool . . . no more moral or 
immoral than a pump handle.”282 Propaganda is not inherently evil. It proves a pervasive 
vehicle for the public to receive information from a variety of sources. Propaganda offers 
a way to inform, explain, and convince a target audience to act according to its message. 
That message could be aimed to prevent chaos, spur product sales, or support a cause or a 
candidate. In terms of warfare, propaganda brings the masses in line to support a conflict. 
During war, the most effective, sustainable propaganda came generated through a 
centrally managed and independent government agency, as in World War I and World 
War II.  
The levels of war intertwine to operate in furtherance of military strategy and 
national policy, or grand strategy. As indicated previously, even exceptionally well-
crafted propaganda based on a faulty premise falls short of meeting its goal. Emile 
Simpson has taken great steps in understanding this problem of strategic narrative within 
the context of the Afghanistan War. Specifically, he focused on the need for an agreed-
upon strategic narrative derived from grand strategy to provide the framework for ground 
commanders to develop military strategy.283 This strategic narrative would influence 
civilian propaganda, which mobilizes domestic audiences while bolstering international 
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support for military action in furtherance of policy and military strategy. Propaganda 
levied domestically and abroad during the war on terror cannot be implemented 
effectively, because current policy is subject to abstraction and lacks a coherent strategic 
narrative. A proper, understandable strategic narrative would provide the basis for 
explaining combat operations, while deterring from would-be terrorists the support they 
have enjoyed to this point.  
Because effective propaganda relates directly to the strategic narrative and policy 
at a given time, it has a shelf life and cannot be expected to remain successful as those 
factors evolve or once a credibility gap emerges. Since the Korean War, policymakers 
and the military have run the business of domestic war propaganda without an 
independent government agency tasked with propaganda development. Policy and 
strategy can shift from defeating an enemy and reducing the enemy’s desire or ability to 
fight into a case for sustainment operations and nation-building. Sustainment operations 
and nation-building are long undertakings. As insurgency develops and costs rise, they 
also can be difficult and dragging, with only a chance of succeeding when national 
mobilization, and not solely military mobilization, occurs. Effective propaganda has the 
potential for periodic rebranding. America will not spend blood and treasure indefinitely.  
In the twenty-first century, the military has become increasingly divorced from 
broader society, a result of perceptions of various conflicts over the past several decades. 
While the military was not divorced from society during the Vietnam War, it did suffer 
from a lack of credibility gap in its final years, which brought the war to an inglorious 
end. While not elucidated in this paper, the first Gulf War demonstrated how policy 
makers and the military can run a successful short-term propaganda campaign during 
short-lived military conflict. To contrast, the war in Iraq was essentially the replay of the 
first Gulf War. As the credibility gap opened with the revelation that weapons of mass 
destruction did not exist, public opinion suffered, much like post-Tet Vietnam. No 
independent propagandist agency existed to advise policy makers and the military. In the 
end, the shift from all-out war into sustainment and regime change followed by nation 
building could not be sold to the American people in the long term. The conflict had 
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reached the end of its shelf life, and President Bush lost the initiative, no matter how 
morally it was originally conceived.  
Propagandist involvement at the highest levels of government had the potential to 
change the conversation over the war on terror. With such consultation regarding 
strategic narrative, the government could have been confronted by the unlikelihood of 
their success and the debacle of a decade of war in Iraq may have been avoided. 
Essentially, propagandists not only work to build techniques for propaganda 
implementation, but they can also act as balancing agents in the development of political 
and military strategy. While pol-mil relations should exist to prevent both policymakers 
and military strategists alike from misstep, propagandists must weigh-in to explain the 
likelihood or unlikelihood of being able to effectively present a given conflict and imply 
its corresponding strategic effects. They ensure that strategic narrative and policy are 
congruent. They further ensure that such a narrative avoids abstraction and seeks to 
further strengthen civilian belief in the rightness of government policy. During WWII, 
but prior to the OWI, Winkler explains, “It all seemed to boil down to three complaints. 
First there was too much information; second, there wasn’t enough of it; and third, that in 
any event it was confusing and inconsistent.”284 
Modern military, government, and policy makers benefit from a review of the 
image of the paradoxical trinity, which reflects the energy of the people and democracy 
in the epoch of total war. During WWI, the muckrakers gave Woodrow Wilson the means 
to fight the propaganda war. This strategy was then somewhat duplicated in the Second 
World War on a much greater scale, and in the Cold War until the end of the 1960s. At 
that point, by 1966, the skepticism about the Cold War had become tangible. America has 
had periods of great debate and dissent followed by unity and focus. The Vietnam War 
reached its height in 1966–1968, culminating in the Tet offensive, which showed on 
television the North Vietnamese coming from all directions. As General Westmoreland 
insisted that their strategy had been working amid the disheartening coverage, the Cold 
War consensus began its decline. 
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The decline led to the “stab in the back” legend about Vietnam. The press and the 
counterculture were believed to have lost the war, that it had nothing to do with the 
military, which tried to fight a conventional war but faced political hurdles. The distillate 
of that era is, in the all-volunteer force, among professional officers the suspicion of the 
press and fundamentally forgetting that the real energy in war of anger, hatred, and 
purpose or the fuel for the purpose comes from the people. The result after Vietnam is a 
disconnect and the real symbol of it is arguably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
attempt at manipulation of public opinion through the DOD.  
B. AN OLD IDEA AND A NEW AGENCY? 
Why didn’t GWOT develop an institution like the CPI or OWI? The Rendon 
Group and the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) play notable roles in the war, but never 
really produce a successful campaign fruition. Arguably, without these institutions the 
management of propaganda and adherence to strategic narrative doesn’t occur. Positive 
strategic effect did not come about in propaganda to the America people, who questioned 
the purpose, policy, and players in the war. As the war continued, they pushed the Bush 
administration and Congress over the reasons for fighting, the continued presence in the 
region, and the use of military contractors, among other concerns.  
Major General Anthony Cucolo, Chief of Public Affairs for the United States 
Army, described how the U.S. Army communicates. “I would describe us in rashly, 
almost unfair and classic Army-hard-on-ourselves general terms as: slow, reactive, not 
very creative, unable to speak in easily understood language, and poor at giving context,” 
he said. “At times, we are too focused on operational security and give a perception of, at 
best, being defensive and, at worst, obstructionist.”285 As the head of Army public 
affairs, the general should be considered highly informed and cognizant of Army 
information shortcomings.  
During time of war, an independent propaganda agency could supplement these 
shortcomings, by supporting the strategic narrative at home and abroad. This agency, 
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constructed on a solid basis in pluralistic politics, could employ best past propaganda 
strategies in the modern age. The problem of being slow and reactive poses a dilemma. In 
some cases, it may have been better to contemplate information release for fear of 
producing negative strategic effect. The Army’s reactivity and timeliness issues could be 
resolved through restructuring. A system to categorize, prioritize, and assign a certain 
value of relevance to each piece of information would help ensure communication is 
addressed at the appropriate time. Cucolo also pointed out that we are “not very creative.” 
The CPI and OWI hired thousands of writers, cartoonists, and artists. In each medium, 
they hired some of the best creators in their respective fields. Some of the most creative 
minds were leveraged with widely accepted success. In a contemporary context, this 
strategy could involve well-known creatives like Steven Spielberg directing 
governmental movies and Seth MacFarlane directing war cartoons. When civilian 
propagandists produce the communication, they overcome some of the awkward 
weaknesses of the Army, as described by Cucolo. With their outside perspective, civilian 
creatives could ensure that military vernacular gets translated into easily understood 
civilian terms and places the broader propaganda campaign in a relevant context for 
American audiences. 
Analysis of wartime propaganda, whether historic examples or in the current 
landscape of the global war on terror, cannot definitively determine their success. Yet, 
war after war, research shows the use of mass persuasion has a significant impact and 
relationship with outcomes and perceptions. Propaganda affects the paradoxical trinity, 
the animating factors behind why countries go to war in the first place and how they fight 
best. Propaganda’s reach extends across the military and the general public, influencing 
mobilization and morale. 
In 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker declared the importance of an informed 
American public and mass mobilization for war, “It was necessary to have somebody 
who understood why we are at war, and in saying that I speak not of a who could 
comprehend merely the difficult international problems with regard to it, but the spirit 
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that made us go into this war, and the things we were fighting for.”286 As it has been 
shown, propaganda derived and implemented systematically, honestly, and completely 
coincided with overall military success. All levels of war require a greater effort to train 
strategists to recognize the need for propaganda’s inclusion in planning. In addition, 
reexamining this training paradox of the political level is necessary too. The utilization of 
highly effective twenty-first century ad-men and publicists does not offer adequate 
consideration of the use and impact of propaganda and its relation to policy and military 
strategy. With little understanding of military strategy, operation, or tactics, coupled with 
foreign relations and policy they may be ill-equipped to comprehend the entire problem 
set of war and how involved and abstract it can be. 
Creel and the professional muckrakers, or the OWI staffers offered a relevant 
sense of reality through remaining directly in touch with the civilian American public. 
Unlike the propagandist working for independent agencies, DOD staffers maintain an 
“inside the beltway” mentality. Rather than reaching out to the citizens in an accessible 
way, their communication tends to devolve into PSYOPS and manipulation. Creel and 
Irwin, left-wingers by today’s standards—remained in touch with everyday Americans. 
Their success at aggressively disseminating effective war propaganda recalls the potential 
and purpose of mass persuasion. Comparatively, the later Vietnam period and the recent 
global war on terror have both fallen far short and missed out on this impact. To bring 
back successful propaganda, and to seamlessly incorporate it into the high-tech, 
constantly connected twenty-first century world, America must take a more expansive 
view of war, across segments of the government, media, and society. They must see the 
importance of a grand narrative and overarching strategy—the historic underpinnings of 
the best examples of propaganda in the country’s past.  
Brewer writes, “In recent years the officials charged with constructing and 
delivering persuasive messages were more likely to have backgrounds in politics, public 
relations and marketing, media, and entertainment than to have expertise in foreign 
relations.”287 This may be so, but who else should be charged with propaganda’s 
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construction? More importantly, she explains, “Their concern was the successful selling 
of war aims rather than the quality of the policy being sold. This phenomenon was not 
altogether new, but the trend has led to a greater disconnect between the war aims being 
promoted and the policy being conducted.”288  
In 2001, Washington realized the need for a new informational apparatus.289 By 
2002, the DOD had implemented the OSI, but within a short period of time, due to media 
outcry, it was disestablished.290 There were three immediate problems. First, the DOD 
was the wrong enterprise for a “clandestine” domestic propaganda agency, as it could 
conceivably produce both white and black propaganda. Its dissemination to domestic 
audiences was tainted with the pejorative “propaganda,” and confusion over its level of 
truthfulness. Second, the agency needed to be civilian-run, and specifically identified as 
an overtly truthful endeavor to inform the American people. While the average person 
does not understand the amount of propaganda he or she consumes every day, the 
perception persists that propaganda is bad. Any effort to communicate information to the 
public at wartime must be made to focus on the inherent truthfulness of its content. Third, 
for those who resist increased levels of government bureaucracy, the agency disbands as 
soon as the conflict is complete, as Presidents Wilson and Truman did in the past. The 
purpose of the agency is to support and manage public information for the duration of the 
war, and not to be used as a tool for public manipulation in other circumstances. 
Information needs to be centrally managed during war, especially in the information 
proliferated world of the twenty-first century.  
Historically, officials had recognized the specific scope of these propaganda 
agencies. Bacevich explains that, “Senior military and civilian officials who managed 
World War II had viewed public support for the war as both critical and finite, an 
essential asset to be carefully nurtured and no less carefully expanded.”291Their approach 
resulted in pervasive propaganda, which sought to maintain and increase morale while 
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illustrating the light at the end of the tunnel.292  This light is conspicuously missing as the 
GWOT draws to some sort of close. 
C. WHY WE FIGHT 
In the twenty-first century, many Americans have lost the fundamental 
understanding of why their country goes to war in the face of the inchoate challenges and 
threats beyond the physical destruction wrought on television in the capital cities of the 
nation in peacetime. To them, the means no longer corresponded to the ends. During the 
years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, they did not remember how the whole endeavor 
works—from the initial decision to enter into conflict, to how and why it should be 
concluded. Propaganda and the media have played a central role, once again, in the 
country’s understanding of war and its critique. As Strachan clearly states, the problem 
began long before propaganda and the media have come into play, but an independent 
governmental propaganda agency may reduce the governmental credibility gap, as it had 
in the past.  
Unlike total war in the past, the United States and its allies are not fighting a war 
for national survival.293 Strachan explains, “After 9/11 Bush and Blair tried to overcome 
the divergence by using the rhetoric of ‘total war,’ or rather of the ‘global war on terror.’ 
But in doing so, they failed to understand the nature of the war on which they had 
embarked, which seemed far from ‘total’ to the societies which they sought to 
mobilize.”294  
No matter the propaganda or media attention received, total mobilization and a 
subsequent win in the war on terror were never likely due to the situation of the war in 
the first place. The global war on terror has had diffuse strategic goals; limited means; 
overreaching scope; and religious dimensions, which tend to escalate conflict and 
nullifies a policy of limited engagement. In this case, it is unlikely that propagandists 
could have averted the strategic missteps. Yet, propagandists involved at the uppermost 
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levels of policy and strategy development could have weighed in to explain the lack of 
correlation between policy, strategy, and propaganda. Even though the war in Iraq has 
been concluded and conflict in Afghanistan nearly so, the overarching terrorism that led 
to their necessity in the first place has not been eliminated.  
There is still a chance to rectify the propaganda, policy, strategy mismatch needed 
to successfully win the overarching war on terrorism. The most important step is to 
understand that there are three sides to the trinity—not just the military and the policy it 
supports, but the public as well. The public is the center of gravity, in fact. It determines 
what is acceptable and not acceptable in warfare, and it should be informed to allow for 
necessary critique of policy, war aims, and the decision to engage in war’s ferocity. There 
also needs to be a greater understanding of the relationship between policy, strategy, and 
propaganda development. It is simply not enough for two sides of the trinity to manage 
during protracted limited war. Determine who the enemy is. If the enemy is not state 
based, a  lower level of military involvement is needed.  
The problem then is more one of a police nature more correctly served from the 
diplomatic realm of the united states government. To be sure terrorism is an dangerous 
threat, but limited blood and treasure does not allow for global “whack-a-mole.” A 
worldwide military operation arguable creates more insurgency and enemies than it 
purports to kill.  
Lastly, if all of these criteria are met, then an independent governmental 
propaganda agency, with a well-known, well respected, and non-partisan head, should 
lead the effort to inform and  energize the American public to win at war. Their goals 
should be synchronization of messaging from the DOD, Washington, and all other 
governmental agencies. In addition, they will work to develop easily understood 
messaging that embodies policy and frames the strategic narrative for all involved. 
America has done it in the past and won its wars, and it could—and should—do it again.  
  
 73 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Almond, Gabriel A, and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
Apple, R. W., Jr. . “25 Years Later: Lessons From the Pentagon Papers.” New York 
Times, June 23, 1996, sec. Week in Review. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/23/weekinreview/25-years-later-lessons-from-
the-pentagon-papers.html. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their 
Country. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt, 2013. 
Bassani Jr, Joseph A. “Saving the World for Democracy. An Historical Analysis of 
America’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century.” Master’s thesis, Norfolk: U.S. 
Joint Forces Staff College, 2005, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD
A436658. 
Belgrad, Daniel. The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Berinsky, Adam J. In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World 
War II to Iraq. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Bernays, Edward L, and Mark Crispin Miller. Propaganda. Brooklyn, NY: Ig, 2005. 
Bernhard, Nancy E. U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Brewer, Susan A. Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the 
Philippines to Iraq. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 




Brown, Robin. “Clausewitz in the Age of CNN: Rethinking the Military-Media 
Relationship.” In Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the 
Public, edited by Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion R Just, 43–58. New 
York: Routledge, 2003. 
  
 74 
Bush, George W. “Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training 
Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001.” The 
American Presidency Project, April 18, 2014. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65088&st=address+to+the+na
tion&st1=. 
Carruthers, Susan L. The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 
Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the 
United States, 1950-1953. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10282218. 
Cioppa, T. M. “Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Communication Analysis and 
Assessment.” Media, War & Conflict 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2009): 25–45. 
doi:10.1177/1750635208101353. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Cordesman, Anthony H, and Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington. 
Changing U.S. Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War” 
against “Non-Terrorism,” 2013. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/130917_Cordesman_ChangingU.S.SecurityStrateg
y_Web.pdf. 
Creel, George. How We Advertised America. New York: Arno Press, 1972. 
Cucolo, Anthony. “The Military and the Media: Shotgun Wedding, Rocky Marriage, 
Committed Relationship.” Media, War & Conflict 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 84–89. 
doi:10.1177/1750635207087628. 
Culbert, David Holbrook, Janice H Mitchel, Dobrosky, United States, and Office of War 
Information. A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Information Control and 
Propaganda: Records of the Office of War Information. Frederick, MD: 
University Publications of America, 1986. 
Cull, Nicholas John, David Holbrook Culbert, and David Welch. Propaganda and Mass 
Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2003. 
Der Derian, James. Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment 
Network. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Emery, Robert A. “The Official Bulletin, 1917-1919: A Proto-Federal Register.” Law 
Library Journal 102 (2010): 441–48. 
 75 
Ford, Nancy Gentile. The Great War and America: Civil-Military Relations during World 
War I. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. 
Fraser, L. M. Propaganda. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. 
Friedrich, Carl J. The New Belief in the Common Man. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942. 
Guth, David W. “From OWI to USIA: The Jackson Committee’s Search for the Real 
‘Voice’ of America.” American Journalism 19, no. 1 (2002): 13–37. 
Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 
Hang, Teo Cheng. “Non-Kinetic Warfare: The Reality and the Response.” Pointer: 
Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 36, no. 2 (2010). 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2010/v36n1/feat
ure5.html. 
Howard, Michael. War and the Liberal Conscience. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1978. 
Jackall, Robert, and Janice M Hirota. Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and 
the Ethos of Advocacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis. Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons 
from the Past Decade of Operations, Suffolk, VA: JCOA, June 15, 2012.  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: JCOS, 2001.  
Kerttunen, Mika. “Organic Clausewitz,” January 28, 2014. 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/international/BalticDefenseColle
ge/Organic-Clausewitz.pdf. 
Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D. Black. “What to Show the World: The Office of 
War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945.” The Journal of American History 
64, no. 1 (1977): 87–105. 
Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in World War I. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. 
Press, 1971. 
LeCuyer, Jack. “Op-Ed: A National Strategic Narrative and Grand Strategy for the 21st 
Century.” The Global Strategy Institute, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2007. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/A-
National-Strategic-Narrative-and-Grand-Strategy-for-the-21st-Century/2011/7/1. 
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
 76 
MacDonald, C. A. Korea, the War before Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1987. 
Marlin, Randal. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion. Peterborough, ON: 
Broadview Press, 2002. 
Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of 
France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Mullen, Mike. “Strategic Communications: Getting Back to Basics.” Joint Force 
Quarterly, no. 55 (2009): 2–4. 
Office of Government Inquiries, and Office of War Information. “United States 
Government Manual.” United States Government Manual, 1945. 
Osgood, Kenneth Alan. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at 
Home and Abroad. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006. 
Packard, Vance. The Hidden Persuaders. Brooklyn, NY: Ig, 2007. 
Page, Caroline. U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The 
Limits of Persuasion. London: Leicester University Press, 1996. 
Parry-Giles, Shawn J. “‘Camouflaged’ Propaganda: The Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations’ Covert Manipulation of News.” Peace Research Abstracts 36, 
no. 3 (1999). 
Rid, Thomas. War and Media Operations the U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam 
to Iraq. London: Routledge, 2007. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10167799. 
Robin, Ron Theodore. The Making of the Cold War Enemy Culture and Politics in the 
Military-Intellectual Complex. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. “Executive Order 9182 Establishing the Office of War 
Information. June 13, 1942.” The American Presidency Project, February 14, 
2014. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16273. 
Schlesinger, P. “From Production to Propaganda?” Media, Culture & Society 11, no. 3 
(1989): 283–306. 
Schulze, Hagen, and William E Yuill. States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle 
Ages to the Present. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
Schweikart, Larry. A Patriot’s History of the United States: From Columbus’s Great 
Discovery to the War on Terror. New York: Sentinel, 2004. 
 77 
———. America’s Victories: Why the U.S. Wins Wars and Will Win the War on Terror. 
New York: Sentinel, 2006. 
“Senate Foreign Relations Committee Releases Volumes Of Previously Classified 
Transcripts From Vietnam Era Hearings | United States Senate Committee on 




Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New 
York: Random House, 1988. 
Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics. 
London: Hurst, 2012. 
Sproule, J. Michael. Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media 
and Mass Persuasion. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
Steuter, E., and D. Wills. “‘The Vermin Have Struck Again’: Dehumanizing the Enemy 
in Post 9/11 Media Representations.” Media, War & Conflict 3, no. 2 (August 1, 
2010): 152–67. doi:10.1177/1750635210360082. 
Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1982. 
Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, Third Edition. 
Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003. 
Truman, Harry S. “Executive Order 9608: Providing for the Termination of the Office of 
War Information, 13 August, 1948.” The American Presidency Project, February 
14, 2014. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60671. 
United States and Bureau of the Budget. The United States at War: Development and 
Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government. Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1946. 
United States and Committee on Public Information. The Activities of the Committee on 
Public Information. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918.  
United States Census Bureau. “Population,” February 11, 2014. 
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt. 
 78 
United States Department of Defense. “Principal Wars in Which the United States 
Participated.” Defense Casualty Analysis System. Accessed April 8, 2014. 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_principal_wars.xhtml. 
United States, Office of War Information, Domestic Branch, and Bureau of Motion 
Pictures. Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry. 
Washington, DC: Office of War Information, 1942. 
USA Today. “Pentagon Drops ‘Strategic Communication.’” Accessed April 4, 2014. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/03/pentagon-trims-strategic-
communication/1743485/. 
———. “Pentagon Overseas Propaganda Plan Stirs Controversy.” Accessed April 4, 
2014. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/19/pentagon-
overseas-communications-strategy-stirs-controversy/1715741/. 
Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the 
Committee on Public Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980. 
Weinberg, Sydney. “What to Tell America: The Writers’ Quarrel in the Office of War 
Information.” The Journal of American History 55, no. 1 (June 1968): 73. 
doi:10.2307/1894252. 
Winkler, Allan Michael. Politics and Propaganda: The Office of War Information,  
1942–1945. Ann Arbor, MI: Xerox University Microfilms, 1974. 
Woodrow Wilson. “Executive Order 2594 Creating Committee on Public Information, 
April 13, 1917.” The American Presidency Project, February 10, 2014. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75409. 
Zinn, Howard. A People’s History of the United States: 1492-2001. New York: Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics, 2003. 
Zwiebel, Michael J.  “Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA.” Military Review 88 
(2006): 130–39. 
 79 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
